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Abstract
Chapter 1: Public Opinion and Counter-Attitudinal Voting
For decades, Supreme Court scholars have asked whether the Court is responsive to public
opinion. Despite the importance of this question, however, unsettled and often contradic-
tory theory combined with several empirical barriers have prevented scholars from answer-
ing it. This paper takes both theoretical and methodological steps to resolve this debate
and argues that there is a direct relationship between public opinion and the choices jus-
tices make. Specifically I examine the conditions under which justices deviate from their
ideologies to cast votes in line with the majority will. I find that justice are generally
constrained by public opinion. However, the level of that constraint is conditional on the
political environment. In short, justices are most responsive to public opinion when spe-
cific support is critical – when they expect the probability their decision will be reversed
or ignored to be high.
Chapter 2: Public Opinion and Setting the Agenda
When the U.S. Supreme Court decides which cases to hear it weighs a number of legal
and policy considerations. While scholars understand a great deal about how each of these
considerations factor into a justice’s decision to grant a case, each term the Court faces
this same set of considerations in hundreds of issue areas. Much less is understood about
why the Court chooses to hear some issues and reject others. Adding to this literature, I
argue that justices choose cases with public opinion in mind. Using a novel issue-specific
and justice-specific measure of likely divergence from public opinion, I argue justices are
forward-looking and select cases in which they are least likely to face pressure from public
opinion to deviate from their ideological preferences at the merits stage. However, the rela-
tionship between public opinion and agenda setting is not direct. Rather, it is conditioned
on the level of diffuse support the Court enjoys and the legal importance of the case. I also
vi
present some of the first systematic evidence that the Court is responsive to public issue
salience when deciding what to decide.
Chapter 3: Public Opinion and Stare Decisis
The U.S. Supreme Court, through the norm of stare decisis is responsible for setting
the direction of the rule of law in the United States. However, to date the exploration
of the Court’s use of precedent in the literature has focused on internal ideological and
institutional explanations, largely ignoring the potential for external constraint. Taking a
step away from the traditional formulation of the Court’s use of precedent, I explore the
role of public opinion on the Court’s treatment of its own precedent over time and in its
majority opinions. I find no effect of public opinion on the decision to treat precedent even
when conditioning the effect on the salience of the treated case, the Court’s level of diffuse
support, nor the level of threat posed by Congress. In short, while justices may be highly
responsive to public opinion in the more conspicuous aspects of its decision-making, they
seem to largely ignore public opinion when applying or creating legal rules.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
When Justice Lewis Powell cast his decisive vote in Bowers vs. Hardwick in March
of 1986 he could not have anticipated how far-reaching the decision upholding a Georgia
sodomy law would become or how much he would come to regret his vote in the case. In
a well-documented conversation, Powell explained his decision to one of his clerks that he
simply could not relate to the “gay lifestyle” and that he did not believe he had ever met a
gay person. Ironically, one of Powell’s clerks that very term was gay (Jeffies 1994). Perhaps
unsurprisingly for the time, Powell’s ambivalence about homosexuality was shared by the
country. A July 1986 Gallup poll suggested that only 32% of Americans believed homo-
sexual relations between consenting adults should be legal (Bowman, Rugg and Marisco
2013).
The decision in Bowers allowed sodomy laws specifically targeting homosexuals to
remain on the books in at least fourteen states until the Court reversed its decision in
Lawrence vs. Texas nearly 20 years later. There are a number of possible explanations for
the Court’s shift in jurisprudence from Bowers to Lawrence. Among the most compelling is
that the country itself changed in the 17 years between the two decisions. By May of 2003,
as many as 60% of Americans favored legalizing homosexual relations (Bowman, Rugg and
Marisco 2013) and the gay rights movement had made advancements on a number of fronts
from convincing state legislatures to repeal their sodomy laws in 12 states to winning the
right to adopt children in 5 states, to removing an outright ban on gays and lesbians in
the military with the advent of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. Indeed, Bowers was
1
2negatively cited, or at least questioned, by as many as 14 subsequent Supreme Court and
federal circuit court decisions in the intervening years.
Importantly, a change in Court membership would not have predicted the Court’s
reversal of Bowers. Six of the nine justices from the original Bowers decision had retired,
and in the chairs of Liberal Lions such as Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan sat
the staunchly conservative Clarence Thomas and the dedicated moderate David Souter.
Indeed, if anything the Rehnquist Court of 2003 was significantly more conservative than
the Burger Court of 1986.
The liberalization of the Court on gay rights is just one notable example of when
shifts in public opinion can provide a more complete explanation for judicial decision-
making than individual ideology or static legal doctrine. More than that, the decision
in Lawrence highlights a number of important normative questions that my dissertation
will seek to answer. Most notably, to what extent does the Supreme Court directly follow
shifts in public opinion? If the Court is as responsive to changes in the public mood as
Lawrence seems to suggest, is the Court the “protector of liberties [for] minorities against
the tyranny of the majority” or is it rather part of a “dominant national alliance” (Dahl
1957, 283)? These normative questions naturally give way to more empirical questions
of whether the Court is actually responsive to public opinion or if it merely uses it as a
source to justify its decisions and, if it is responsive, to what extent must there be majority
consensus on an issue before the Court responds? Finally, my dissertation attempts to get
closer to understanding the theoretical mechanism that drives the only unelected branch
of government to be responsive to the will of the majority.
There are a number of reasons to believe that the Supreme Court should be largely
insulated from public opinion. Supreme Court justices are not publicly elected nor must
they be reelected, or even retained. Indeed, they serve life tenures and, at least in the
modern era, have little desire for career advancement beyond the Supreme Court. Their
decisions are rarely overturned or ignored by Congress or the Executive (but see Spiller
and Tiller 1996; Clark and McGuire 1996; Clark 2009; Spriggs and Uribe Forthcoming).
Finally, Supreme Court justices exist within an elite Washington community which might
make them increasingly unaware of broader public sentiment (Baum and Devins 2010);
this is especially true given fewer and fewer justices in recent year ever served as elected
3public officials.
Despite these reasons to the contrary, however, there is a fair amount of evidence in
the political science literature to suggest that the Court is generally responsive to public
opinion, at least in the aggregate (see Mishler and Sheehan 1993; Norpoth and Segal 1994;
Link 1995; Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson 1995; McGuire and Stimson 2004; Clark 2009;
Casillas, Enns and Wohlfarth 2011; Hall Forthcoming). However, these studies do not
agree on the exact empirical nature of that relationship. For example Mishler and Sheehan
(1993) and Norpoth and Segal (1994) disagree over whether there is a relationship at all
between public opinion and the the Court’s policy outputs, McGuire and Stimson (2004),
Hall (Forthcoming), and Casillas, Enns and Wohlfarth (2011) disagree about the types of
cases that should be most influenced by public opinion and whether social factors should
moderate that relationship and Giles, Blackstone and Vining (2008) add that public opinion
may not influence the Court’s ideological output but rather influences the liberalism of
specific justices.
Moreover, the existing literature on public opinion and Supreme Court responsiveness
also lacks consensus on a theoretical mechanism. Even if the literature could agree that
public opinion did directly affect Court decision-making, it does not agree on why. Indeed,
Marshall (2008), in one of the most comprehensive theoretical works to date, outlines
as many as 15 different possible linkages between the Court and public opinion. These
linkages range from the “Interest Group Model” which argues that interest groups should
take positions with broad national support and justices are, in turn, influenced by interest
groups through amicus curiae participation, to the “Appointment Process” model in which
justices follow public opinion because they share the beliefs of the presidents who appointed
them and who are popularly elected1 to the “Length of Tenure” model which predicts that
the longer a justice serves on the bench, the more disconnected from the mass public she
will become and the further she will stray from publicly popular decisions.
1See Norpoth and Segal (1994) for empirical support for this model. Importantly, Nor-
poth and Segal conclude that the relationship between public opinion and Supreme Court
decision-making is entirely mediated by the confirmation process and there is no direct
relationship between changes in public opinion and the decisions justices make.
4In his largely descriptive and anecdotal analysis of the decision-making of the Rehn-
quist Court, Marshall finds support for several of these models. Most notably, he found
initial support for models that consider the strength of public opinion, the relationship
between public opinion and the elected branches, and the consistency between a justice’s
own ideology and public opinion; Marshall’s inductive approach provided scholars with
the outline of what would become the dominant explanation for the theoretical mecha-
nism linking public opinion and the Court. Baum (2006, 63) describes what I will call the
“Constraint Model” as
. . . instrumental but not narrowly self-interested: the justices seek to maximize
the Court’s effectiveness as a policymaker. Approval for the Court within the
mass public leads to better implementation of its decisions, reduces the chance
that other branches will limit or reverse those decisions, and deters action by
the legislature and executive against the Court itself.
In other words, the constraint model argues that justices follow public opinion because
they fear that not doing so will harm their legitimacy, make backlash from the elected
branches more likely, and decrease the efficacy of their decisions. Most scholars who have
examined the linkages between public opinion and the Court rely on some variant of the
Constraint Model (see Mishler and Sheehan 1993; Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson 1995;
McGuire and Stimson 2004; Casillas, Enns and Wohlfarth 2011; Hall Forthcoming).
My theory relies on the constraint model as a starting place. However, I argue that the
implications of this model lead to more nuanced predictions than scholars have previously
explored. The constraint model posits that justices are actually incentivized to follow public
opinion in the pursuit of two related but separate goals: diffuse and specific support. Diffuse
support refers to the legitimacy of the Court as an institution. The American people,
Gibson and Caldeira (1992) argue, have a positivity bias toward the Court. “[P]reexisting
institutional loyalty [to the Supreme Court] shapes [public] perceptions of and judgements
about court decisions and events” (Gibson and Caldeira 2009b). In essence, the higher the
level of diffuse support the Court enjoys, the more the public is willing to accept the Court’s
5decisions, even those decisions with which it disagrees. Thus, the traditional argument
goes, “in order to protect the Court’s esteemed legitimacy, strategic justices (through their
collective decisions) should avoid repeatedly issuing deviant rulings that have the potential
to incite negative reactions from the media and mass public” (see Casillas, Enns and
Wohlfarth 2011, 76).
In a related vein, justices also seek specific support, or public approval of individual
decisions. In the pursuit of specific support, the link between public opinion and decision
making is much more direct: justices follow public opinion in specific cases to ensure
compliance with those decisions. As the Court can neither fund nor enforce its decisions, it
must rely on the publicly elected branches to see its policies enacted into law. Thus, when
the Court issues unpopular decisions, it risks those decisions being either reversed by the
elected branches or merely ignored by the American people; the Court relies on specific
support for its decisions to be implemented.
While the utility of these goals suggests a relatively straightforward mechanism for the
relationship between public opinion and judicial decision-making, it also suggests that the
relationship should not be static over time and across all cases. Following public opinion is
not without costs to the justices who have ideological goals that are often distinct from the
majority view. Justices then, should be most inclined to follow public opinion when gar-
nering either diffuse or specific support is particularly important. In other words, the effect
of public opinion on decision-making is conditioned on the political environment in which
the Court finds itself. As I outline in the chapters to come, justices respond to the salience
of the case and the issue they face, the signals they receive from the elected branches, and
their own existing level of institutional legitimacy when deciding how majoritarian their
decisions need to be.
In addition to advancing and adding clarity to the theoretical mechanism driving the
6relationship between public opinion and decision-making I also push past the literature’s
empirical investigations of this relationship. Specifically, to date scholars have focused
exclusively on the role public opinion place in the direction of the Court’s ideological
outcomes on the merits; is the Court more likely to issue victories to liberal parties as the
Court becomes more liberal? But this focus ignores some of the most interesting aspects of
the Court’s process and some of its most important powers. To this end, my dissertation
also explores the role public opinion plays in two other, as of yet, unexplored choices:
the decision to grant a case, and the treatment of past precedent in the Court’s majority
opinions.
In the next chapter I begin by more fully fleshing out my theoretical argument and
describing the novel data I constructed to test it. These data consist of an issue-specific
measure of policy mood that accounts for the reality that public opinion is often different
across issue areas over time. I then use these data to test my theory on the most straight-
forward component of the Court’s decision-making: justices’ final votes on the merits.
Specifically I examine the conditions under which justices deviate from their ideologies to
cast votes in line with public opinion. I find, consistent with my theoretical argument,
justices are most responsive to public opinion when diffuse support is low or when specific
support is critical.
Chapter Three extends the scope of the theoretical argument to answer another press-
ing question in the judicial politics literature: why the Court chooses to hear some issues
and reject others. In this chapter I argue justices choose cases with public opinion in mind
and select cases in which they are least likely to face pressure from public opinion to devi-
ate from their ideological preferences at the merits stage. However, this relationship too is
conditioned on the political environment and the Court’s institutional obligations to grant
legally salient cases and resolve lower court disputes.
7My final empirical chapter pushes past the more visible decisions the Court makes
(which cases to hear and how to decide them) and questions whether the actual content of
the law is affected by public opinion. Adherents of the strategic model of judicial decision-
making argue almost universally that understanding the content of opinions, rather than
the mere disposition of cases, is the most interesting subject of analysis (see Maltzman,
Spriggs and Wahlbeck 2000). To this end, I examine the role of public opinion on the
Court’s treatment of its own precedent over time and in its majority opinions. I find no
effect of public opinion on the decision to treat precedent even when conditioning on the
political environment. In short, while justices may be highly responsive to public opinion
in the more conspicuous aspects of its decision-making, they seem to largely ignore public
opinion when applying or creating legal rules.
Taken together, the findings I present in the pages to follow paint a picture of a Court
that is cognizant of its role in a democratic society. The justices understand that while
they do not answer to the American people in the same capacity as members of Congress
or the president, checks and balances still creates the majority as a constraint on justices’
pursuit of their ideological goals. The Court requires trust for acceptance of its decision and
acceptance of its decisions for their implementation. Thus, when the Court makes publicly
visible decisions, it has to keep the American people in mind. However, the justifications
the Court uses and the legal rules it establishes are largely unconstrained. In short, as is
so often the case in American politics, the public can only affect what it pays attention to.
Chapter 2
Public Opinion and
Counter-Attitudinal Voting
Introduction
One of the foundational questions in American politics is the extent to which the
Supreme Court, which sits at the top of the nation’s only unelected branch of government,
is responsive to the will of the majority.1 This question is not without normative impor-
tance. On one hand, a high court that is regularly out of line with the general will of the
public seems inconsistent with a healthy democracy. By siding with the majority, a court
overcomes the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.” Bickel (1962) argues that judicial review
can only be legitimate if a court’s decisions are made in line with the expressed desires
of the American people. On the other hand, the institutional structure of the Supreme
1A previous version of this paper was prepared for the 2012 annual meeting of the
Midwest Political Science Association with Christopher D. Kromphardt of the University
of Alabama.
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9Court was designed to resist what Hamilton called the “occasional ill humors [of] society.”
Indeed, many founders believed that the Court’s freedom from electoral pressure would
allow it to be a champion of minority voices.
Since Dahl’s (1957) and Bickel’s (1962), pathbreaking works, scholars have extensively
explored potential linkages between public opinion and Supreme Court decision-making.
However, despite more than 50 years of scholarship, there remains tension in the literature
about the extent to which the public’s will acts as a constraint on the Supreme Court.
Central to the tension is the mechanism driving observed adherence to public opinion.
In what follows, I make at least two contributions to this important debate. First, I
add clarity to the theoretical understanding of why justices follow public opinion. Taking
a step away from the traditional view, I observe that justices are frequently motivated by
more than concern for the institutional legitimacy of the Court. Rather, the decision to rely
on public opinion is a complex strategic calculation on the part of the justice. The potential
for counter-majoritarian decisions to affect trust in, and support for, the Court is just one
of several factors in this calculation. Rather, I argue justices read the political environment
and follow public opinion primarily to ensure compliance with individual decisions. This is
especially true when they expect the probability their decision will be reversed or ignored
to be the highest. My second contribution arises from this approach. I use a novel research
design that focuses on when justices have seemingly abandoned their ideological preferences
in favor of public opinion.
In the next section, I explore the theoretical explanations for the relationship between
public opinion and Supreme Court decision-making, focusing on what would motivate a
justice to feel constrained by public opinion and how these motivations can be distinguished
and tested empirically. In section three, I turn to overcoming several barriers that have
limited the ability of past research to establish a direct relationship between these variables.
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Section four explains my data and methods and the final two sections present and discuss
my findings.
Public Opinion and the Mechanism of Influence
That the Supreme Court would be responsive to public opinion at all is surprising
given that justices are not publicly elected nor must they be reelected, or even retained.
Indeed, they serve life tenure and, at least in the modern era, have little desire for career
advancement beyond the Supreme Court. Further, justices were socialized as lawyers, not
as politicians, whose political survival depends on following the polls (Murphy 1964; Baum
2006). It is increasingly rare for a justice to have experience as an elected official (indeed
that last justice to serve in elected office was Sandra Day O’Connor) and the socialization
of lawyers emphasizes the gravity of an independent judiciary (Friedman 2006).
Despite these reasons to expect justices to care little about public opinion, more than
50 years of scholarship suggests that there is a meaningful relationship between the ideo-
logical output of the Court and prevailing public sentiment. (see e.g. Mishler and Sheehan
1993; Norpoth and Segal 1994; Flemming, Bohte and Wood 1997; McGuire and Stimson
2004; Durr, Martin and Wolbrecht 2000; Epstein and Martin 2010; Giles, Blackstone and
Vining 2008; Casillas, Enns and Wohlfarth 2011; Hall Forthcoming). In fact, the lion’s
share of the literature, especially in the past 25 years, seems to answer the question of
whether the Supreme Court is a majoritarian body with a resounding “yes.” However,
while there is agreement that the Court does appear to follow the majority’s wishes, there
remains uncertainty as to why. This important question requires an answer if we are to
label the Court as a truly majoritarian entity. I argue that the answer lies in the Court’s
relationship to the public. When the Court stands to gain (or retain) something by acqui-
escing to the will of the people, it will do so.
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Until recently, most scholars who have examined the linkages between public opinion
and the Court have argued that justices follow public opinion to bolster their institutional
legitimacy, or “diffuse support” (see Mishler and Sheehan 1993; Stimson, Mackuen and
Erikson 1995; McGuire and Stimson 2004; Casillas, Enns and Wohlfarth 2011). A court’s
concern for diffuse support may cause it to behave strategically. Not all courts enjoy high
levels of diffuse support (Gibson, Caldeira and Baird 1998), and those that do not are
constrained in their efforts to secure compliance, especially when these decisions reflect
divergence from the preferences of other actors. Indeed, diffuse support is believed to be
necessary for the exercise of judicial review (Vanberg 2005). Consequently, the argument
goes, not having to worry about institutional support means a court is freer to behave
sincerely, in pursuit of its preferences. Thus Supreme Court justices who want to see their
decisions broadly applied might be attentive to public opinion so as to maintain sufficient
levels of this judicial public good.
However, much less scholarly attention has been paid to the justices’ desire to gain
specific support, or public approval of individual decisions. This view argues that the link
between public opinion and decision making is much more direct: justices follow specific
public opinion in specific cases because support for those decisions is more critical.
Public Opinion and Specific Support
There are two related reasons for justices to be motivated by specific support. First,
justices who want to see their decisions enacted have an incentive to ensure those decisions
are in line with the preferences of the American people. Starting from the near-axiomatic
premise that justices seek to have their policy preferences etched into law, I argue there are
real costs to deviating from public opinion. When the Court issues unpopular decisions,
the public is liable to respond to those decisions and attempt to affect change in their
12
outcome.
The public has a number of avenues through which they can respond to unpopular
decisions by the Court. First, it can mobilize interest groups and Congress to reverse the
decision. In a series of studies, Meernik and Ignagni demonstrate that Congress is more
likely to act against Supreme Court decisions when those decision are politically unpopular
(Ignagni and Meernik 1994; Meernik and Ignagni 1995; Ignagni and Meernik 1997; Ignagni,
Meernik and King 1998). When this happens, justices lose utility for the case at hand and
suffer the marginal institutional costs and embarrassment associated with being reversed
(Baum 2006; Murphy 1964). Second, the public or Congress can simply turn a blind eye to
the Court’s decisions. Less scholarly attention has been paid to this phenomenon because
it is hard to study implicit non-compliance systematically, but there is a fair amount
of anecdotal evidence of unpopular decisions being simply ignored. Take, for example,
the infamous non-compliance with Brown vs. Board of Education (1954) in the South
(Rosenberg 1991) or the continued practice of organized prayer before high school football
games even after the Court’s decision in Santa Fe ISD vs.Doe (2000) forbade the practice.
Indeed, Hall (2013, Forthcoming) finds that while the Court is fairly successful achiev-
ing compliance with decisions that are “judicial” in nature (decisions that rely primarily
on the lower courts for implementation), compliance from the elected branches is highly
dependent upon the popularity of the decision. In short, the Court’s ability to set law
often relies on positive public opinion, and the Court responds strategically to this reality.
While legitimacy might be a public good for judges, compliance has a bearing on justices’
individual utility. If the public reverses or ignores the Court’s decisions, justices will not
see their policy preferences enacted. To this end, I argue justices respond to public opinion
strategically to ensure compliance with their decisions. Concern for specific support, then,
posits a direct relationship between public opinion and a justice’s vote on the merits.
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However, if concern for specific support directly influences the justices’ votes, we should
expect to observe occasional or even frequent divergence from their sincere preferences. In
other words, following public opinion is not without costs. We should expect justices
to do it only when the likelihood of non-compliance is high. While Hall (Forthcoming)
argues that justices assess the risk of non-compliance on an issue level, being attentive
to public opinion when dealing with issues where the implementation of the decisions is
more likely to be the responsibility of Congress than the judiciary, I take a more holistic
approach and argue that justices evaluate the probability of noncompliance across issue
areas by taking stock of the political environment. In short, I argue that certain factors
make the probability of noncompliance (whether it be by Congress, the lower courts, or the
American people directly) more or less likely and thus should moderate the relationship
between public opinion and votes.
First, as I argue above, the public can only hold the Court accountable for decisions
of which it is aware and understands. While knowledge of decisions tends to be low across
the board, I expect knowledge to be higher in cases that have been extensively covered by
the media. It is also more likely that the public will mobilize to overrule or ignore decisions
with which it disagrees in salient cases, and “the more important the decision, the more
likely it is to arouse Congressional rebuke” (Hall Forthcoming, 2-3) Thus, I expect:
Salience Hypothesis: Justices should be most responsive to public opinion
in salient cases.
By contrast, justices should be free to ignore public opinion in non-salient cases because
there is little threat of retaliation against decisions that never make it into the public’s
consciousness. Salience as a moderating factor is also important insofar as it suggests
there is case-level variation to how constrained justices feel by public opinion.
I expect a similar effect for threats lodged at the Court by Congress. If justices follow
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public opinion to specifically avoid retaliation, they should be especially responsive to
signals from Congress that retaliation is more likely. Clark (2011) argues that Congressional
threats to the Court (in the form of legislation intended to curb the Court’s power) can serve
as a signal of public disapproval of the Court. If justices are concerned with maintaining
specific support for their decisions, they should respond to these signals as signs that
decisions that further alienate the Court from the country are those most in danger of
being overruled. As such, I expect:
Congressional Threat Hypothesis: The effect of public opinion should be
strongest when the Court faces threats from Congress.
Threats of nonimplementation from Congress may motivate justices even when these
threats are rarely put into practices. Hall (Forthcoming, 3) writes, “Frequent non imple-
mentation of the Court’s rulings might reduce its power and degrade its legitimacy over
time. Accordingly, fear of nonimplementation may motivate justices. . . even when override
and sanctions are unlikely.” Moreover, Clark (2011) finds that the Court responds to Con-
gressional threats to curb the Court’s power because these threats serve as an indication
that the Court is out of line with public opinion and that its legitimacy is at risk. In
other words, the Court is averse to threatening behavior because it is a signal of public
disapproval.
Although fear of nonimplementation is an important motivating factor for the justices
to be concerned with public opinion on individual decision, it is not the only factor. Equally
important, I argue maintaining specific support is one of the most direct ways justices can
bolster diffuse support.
While the canonical understanding of diffuse support suggests that a reservoir of good
will for the Court exists regardless of agreement with individual decisions, more recent
scholarship suggesting that there may be a political valence to diffuse support posits that
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diffuse support and specific support are mutually reinforcing. Building off the finding that
perceptions of the Court’s ideological position, rather than its actual position, matter for
how people view the Court (Hetherington and Smith 2007), Bartels and Johnston (2013)
show that diffuse support may be colored by political beliefs, where one’s perceived political
congruence with the Court affects perceptions of its legitimacy.
Positivity Theory (Gibson and Caldeira 2009a) also suggests specific support may
eventually crystalize into diffuse support. Exposure to the legitimizing symbols associated
with the Court may lead over time to greater belief in the Court as a non-political institu-
tion that is worthy of respect. Empirically Durr, Martin and Wolbrecht (2000) find a link
between the two forms of support: the closer the aggregate ideological output of the Court
adheres to public mood, the more trust the public gives to the Court. The relationship
between diffuse and specific support creates an incentive for justices to cultivate specific
support by following public opinion.
This is incentive especially strong when diffuse support for the Court is low. Apprehen-
sion over diffuse support may heighten the importance of specific support. If the literature
tells us legitimacy matters at all, it matters because low levels of legitimacy can signal that
the public is more willing to mobilize against the Court. Indeed, Zink, Spriggs and Scott
(2009) find that individuals who have a higher trust in the Court are more likely to accept
ideologically distasteful decisions. In other words, the mutually reinforcing relationship
between diffuse and specific support suggests a moderating relationship. When diffuse
support is low, justices seek specific support by following public opinion to heighten diffuse
support because diffuse support frees the Court from having to follow public opinion. Thus
I posit,
Diffuse Support Hypothesis: Justices should be more responsive to public
opinion when diffuse support for the Court is low.
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As with the other two moderating hypotheses, I expect that high support can actually
serve as a buffer, protecting justices’ abilities to pursue their own ideological objectives at
the expense of the general will.
Concern for diffuse support as the motivating factor for specific support has an un-
expected implication: even justices who do not support the Court’s disposition have an
incentive to abandon their ideological preferences to ensure compliance. Under this view,
all justices pay some price for harms to specific support because noncompliance harms
future policy-making abilities of the Court (Clark 2011, 75-80). While the costs paid by
minority coalition members may be lower, dissenters should still prefer general compli-
ance with the Court’s decision to broad noncompliance (see Hausegger and Baum 1999;
Cross and Nelson 2001; Rogers 2001; Hall Forthcoming) Thus my analysis examines a jus-
tices’ propensity to vote in line with public opinion even if she disagrees with the majority
disposition.2
Barriers to Establishing a Direct Relationship
The primary question I seek to answer is when, and under what conditions, there is
a relationship between the zeitgeist and the choices justices make. However, the literature
to date has struggled to answer the even more fundamental question of whether there is
a direct link between public opinion and judicial decision-making. There are two chief
barriers to establishing this direct connection: the difficulty of measuring public opinion,
and the potential for endogeneity between public opinion and a justice’s own preferences.
In this section, I discuss the steps I take to overcome both of these barriers.
2I note, however, that the results I present below are robust to only including majority
coalition votes. See Appendix Table A.1.
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Vote-Level Influence
With a few exceptions (see e.g. Epstein and Martin 2010; Uribe 2012; Enns and Wohl-
farth 2013; Hall Forthcoming) most studies of the interplay between public mood and the
Supreme Court look at how the two move together in the aggregate. Traditionally, the
dependent variable is the percent of liberal outcomes – or, in some cases, the percent of
liberal votes (Giles, Blackstone and Vining 2008; Flemming, Bohte and Wood 1997) – in
a term, and the chief independent variable of interest is Stimson’s policy mood measure
(Stimson 1999). While these studies have contributed tremendously to our understanding
of the Court as a majoritarian institution, they make a more limited contribution to the
question of whether public opinion exerts a direct influence on votes.
There are several reasons a vote-level approach is advisable. First, term-level studies
cannot control for important case-level factors that influence outcomes. Past research has
shown, for example, that amicus support (Collins 2008) and support from the Solicitor
General (Black and Owens 2013) both increase the probability a party will be successful
before the Court. It is entirely possible that when the mood of the country is more liberal,
interest groups and the executive will be more supportive of liberal positions. Indeed, the
opposite could also be true; interest group and executive mobilization for liberal causes
could move the country to be more liberal. In any event, both of these important case-
level controls could influence the chief independent variable of interest (public opinion) and
the dependent variable (ideological outcome) but it would be impossible to uncover this
spurious relationship when cases are aggregated within a term.
Aggregate level analyses likewise face challenges controlling for the most likely alterna-
tive explanation for the ideological direction of policy outputs: the ideological composition
of the Court. Most studies simply use the ideology of the median justice as a proxy, but a
spate of recent studies suggest that the term median (defined by the median Martin and
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Quinn (2002) score in a term) is not the best approximation of opinion control but rather
the true median varies by coalition (Bonneau et al. 2007; Clark and Lauderdale 2010) or
by case (Clark and Lauderdale 2012). Aggregating to the term level not only (perhaps
incorrectly) assumes that the term median always controls case outcome but also assumes
that the term median is always in the majority coalition. However, Enns and Wohlfarth
(2013) make the argument that far beyond varying from case to case,3 the identity of the
median justice is related to case factors that also influence votes. Indeed, one of the chief
implications of their results is that strategic considerations affecting decision-making are
different based on the ideological position of the justice. They conclude, “if we want to
fully understand the Court’s policy outputs it is not enough to analyze how justices, on
average, make decisions” (2013, 15).
The second concern with term-level aggregation is that it assumes the Court is a single
strategic actor. While this assumption is often useful, it is usually tenuous. “The Court”
does not make decisions as a single strategic body with unified preferences. Rather, policy
outputs are a compilation of the preferences of individual justices (Maltzman, Spriggs and
Wahlbeck 2000; Bonneau et al. 2007; Clark and Lauderdale 2010). While all justices should
value specific support for their decisions, and should therefore take actions to preserve that
support, the ideological sacrifices each justice must make to ensure that support are varied.
Not all justices’ preferences are equally distant from the public and therefore justices face
different levels of constraint in the quest for compliance. While one justice might agree
wholeheartedly with public opinion, and thus be able to pursue her own policy preferences
while maintaining majoritarian consistency, a more ideologically distant justice has to weigh
her desire to maintain specific support against pursuing her own policy objectives. It is
3According to their analysis the Martin-Quinn term median is not the swing vote in 23%
of all cases and 45% of all 5-4 decisions.
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impossible to disentangle this effect when aggregating to the term level, which not only
treats all justices as the same but also treats their strategic considerations as the same.4
Finally, an aggregate-level analysis is simply ill-suited for testing my theoretical argu-
ment that posits justices should be constrained in certain types of cases more than others,
such as salient cases. By necessity, a term-level approach assumes that constraint only
varies by term and not from case-to-case. It therefore cannot test the argument that jus-
tices follow public opinion to maintain support for, and acceptance of, their individual
decisions. Thus, a vote-level approach is preferable.
Public Opinion, Ideology, and Observational Equivalence
As I allude to above, the other key challenge to to establishing that public opinion
directly constrains justices’ decisions is disentangling the effect of justices’ sincere prefer-
ences from the preferences of the mass public. Stated differently, the behavior that we
would observe if justices voted their own preferences are often identical to the behavior
we would observe if justices were voting while constrained by public opinion. As Casillas,
Enns and Wohlfarth (2011, 75) write, one possibility is that “the social forces that shape
public opinion also influence justices’ preferences.” Epstein and Martin continue, “it is
equally plausible. . . justices are simply social beings. . . [and] the same things that influence
public opinion may influence the Justices, who are, after all, members of the public too”
(2010, 281, internal quotations omitted).
I take a different approach to overcoming observational equivalence and look for the
4Giles, Blackstone and Vining (2008) and Flemming, Bohte and Wood (1997) recognize
this problem and examine the relationship between public opinion and individual justices,
but both studies still aggregate these votes across a term.
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influence of public opinion on individual votes. Fundamentally, “influence” may be under-
stood as a force acting on a justice to make a decision she would not have made absent that
force. Because it is often not possible to determine whether public opinion and a justice’s
preferences are already aligned (and therefore a justice is merely voting based on her own
ideology) my model analyzes specific instances when justices deviate from ideology. Rather
than examining whether a liberal country can explain a liberal vote, I examine whether
public opinion can help me explain the votes that ideology cannot explain. Thus, my de-
pendent variable is whether a justice casts a “counter-attitudinal” vote, taking on a value
of 1 when a liberal justice casts a conservative vote or when a conservative justice casts a
liberal vote. In short, I argue that the strongest test of influence is whether countervailing
public opinion can induce a justice to abandon her ideological preferences.
Measuring Public Opinion
To date, scholars have generally eschewed a vote-level approach because of the lack of
a sufficiently refined measure of public opinion. Indeed, one of the greatest challenges in the
literature is measurement of public opinion as it relates to the issues that are immediately
before the Court. I address previous approaches to this challenge before introducing an
approach that is neither too narrow nor too broad and could plausibly guide the justices’
attempts to align their votes with public opinion.
A few studies, which I call “congruence studies” (see e.g. Marshall 1989, 2008) have
sought to overcome this barrier by locating polling questions that specifically map onto
cases the Court decides. For example, a congruence study might rely on a question along
the lines of “The Supreme Court has recently decided X. Do you support this decision?” and
examine whether the Court’s decision was in the same direction as the majority response.
However, this strategy has a number of potential limitations. First, these questions are
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often ex post. There is no way of telling whether respondents support the decision because
they merely trust the Court’s judgement (Franklin and Kosaki 1989; Johnson and Martin
1998) or if the question taps into actual attitudes about the issue in the case. Indeed, this
question type could be tapping into a host of other attitudes, from the respondent’s diffuse
support for the Court, to her ignorance (or knowledge) of the case, to her beliefs about the
Court’s partisan affiliation as it relates to her own.
These issues aside, the biggest problem is that direct polling data are only available
on a small number of issues and cases, generally the most highly salient. This means that
congruence studies are confined to examine only the effect of public opinion on landmark
cases. Of course, there are a number of reasons to suggest landmark cases are at best
very different from most of the cases the Court decides and, at worst, anecdotal outliers
which buck “true” empirical trends. Further, if congruence data are limited to landmark
cases, they cannot be used to examine how salience conditions the effect of public opinion.
In short, congruence studies provide too narrow a scope through which to examine true
influence.
While congruence studies might be too narrow, the general approach taken by scholars
who utilize the Stimson (1999) mood measure might be too broad. Stimson’s measure,
which factor analyzes thousands of polling questions over the last 65 years, estimates a
single quarterly or yearly number for the mood of the country ranging from 0 (highly
conservative) to 100 (highly liberal).
The primary concern with treating public opinion as a time-varying unidimensional
mood is that it treats all issues and cases in a given quarter the same. Thus, even studies
that model individual votes (Uribe 2012; Enns and Wohlfarth 2013) or case outcomes
(Epstein and Martin 2010; Hall Forthcoming) do not allow for variation in public opinion
across cases decided in a given quarter. This may be especially troubling for studies that
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argue the relationship between public opinion and decision making is issue dependent (see
Hall Forthcoming).
Models that use the Stimson mood assume the public equally desires a liberal outcome
in a criminal rights case, a tax policy case, and a free speech case decided in the same
quarter. There are good intuitive reasons to believe this is not the case, and as I explain
below, there are also good empirical reasons to reject this assumption. Indeed, while
Stimson and his colleagues have argued thermostatic unidimensional mood is useful (see
especially Ura 2014), more recent work acknowledges that there are important differences
in mood across different issue areas. For example, Coggins et al. (ND) find that certain
issues behave systematically differently over time. While some issues respond directly to
party cues, some behave episodically, others, such as certain civil liberties issues, trend
over time, and still others are thermostatic. To this end, Stimson and his colleagues have
partnered with the Policy Agendas Project to facilitate the construction of policy-specific
mood using user-selected issue areas.5
As the literature has taken a turn toward a more case-based approach, it is increasingly
vital that scholars pin down the mechanism by which the justices are influenced by public
opinion. The aggregated public mood would be too blunt a tool to provide much specific
guidance for justices’ decision making in individual cases. As unlikely as it is that justices
are reading specific polling data for every case, it seems equally unlikely that justices
can discern how generally liberal or conservative the mood of the nation is in order to
apply that information to specific issues present in a case that is before them. While
justices exist within the political system and media environment, and some appear to be
active observers of changes in the national ideological landscape (Clark 2011, 79), they are
probably not reading polling data on every issue that comes before the Court. Rather,
5See http://www.policyagendas.org/moodapp.
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justices, as engaged members of their political environment, are more likely to be aware of
broad categories of opinion; for instance, they are more likely to be aware of how the public
feels about civil liberties in general than to be aware of public opinion on free speech in
schools. Indeed, there is reason to believe individuals in the mass public do not even have
stable opinions on narrow policy issues (Zaller 1992; Goren 2012).
This problem is exacerbated when, as I show below, issue categories diverge from the
overall mood. The trick to solving the problems that arise from using the general mood
measure as an independent variable when studying case votes is to construct a measure
that is narrow enough to capture important issue-level variation and yet broad enough to
have reliable data. In order to be part of a plausible theoretical mechanism the measure
also needs to be broad enough that we could reasonably expect justices to be aware of
changes in public opinion.
Here I adopt a middling approach, using issue categories within the public mood. To
this end I construct a new issue-specific measure of public opinion using Stimson’s original
dataset of more than 8000 domestic policy questions. Specifically, I use Stimson’s WCALC
algorithm to estimate a unique mood series for seven issue areas: civil liberties, criminal
rights, defense, economics, the environment, government power, and societal welfare.6
6I inductively created these issue areas based on the types of questions in Stimson’s
data and the issue distinctions that are typically relevant in the judicial politics literature.
However, it is worth noting that my results are robust to using the 20 broad issue areas of
the Policy Agendas Project (Jones and Baumgartner 2013) (see Table A.2). However, I use
my seven issue organization throughout the dissertation because I believe justices are more
likely to be cognizant of public opinion on these issues than they would be cognizant of
public opinion on transportation or education (which both appear in the Policy Agendas
issues). Further, as Stimson (1999, chapter 4) cautions, policy specific moods can be
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To construct these series, I first coded each of the more than 400 unique questions that
comprise Stimson’s data into these seven categories and estimated an annual mood series
for each issue using only those items. Then to map these estimates onto Supreme Court
cases, I coded each of the more than 250 narrow issue categories used by the Supreme
Court Database (Spaeth et al. 2013) into the same seven dimensions.
The estimates for each series are presented in Figure 2.1. The dashed lines are the issue-
specific moods while the solid lines are Stimson’s general mood. Like with the traditional
Stimson measure, my estimates range from 0 (very conservative) to 100 (very liberal)
though in the course of my analysis (1953 to 2010) mood was never more conservative than
20 across any issue area and was never more liberal than 80. It is also important to note
the values of mood do not have a concrete substantive interpretation on their own (for
instance, a change from 75 to 80 does not mean a change from 75% of the country being
liberal to 80%) but rather must be interpreted as changes relative to other values of mood;
80 simply means slightly more liberal than 75.
Several general trends in Figure 2.1 are worth highlighting. First, there is a fair
amount of face validity to my estimates. Take, for example, the mood for civil rights which
is depicted in the top row second panel from the right. The country’s mood on civil rights
issues was highly volatile in the 1960’s and 70’s, when the country was experiencing a
great deal of social turmoil at the height of the Counter-Culture Revolution, but has been
growing steadily more liberal since the mid-1970’s. Compare this to the nation’s feelings
difficult to construct because the mood algorithm requires a lot of data to be estimated
accurately. In my issue areas, the average number of items used to construct a series is 817
and no series is constructed with fewer than 144 items. By contrast, the Policy Agendas
issues average 367 items per series and are estimated with as few as 67 items. Thus I argue
my seven issue series produces a more reliable estimate of mood.
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on criminal rights (on the far right of the top row). The apex of national liberalism on
criminal rights was during the mid-1960’s, which is intuitive considering that the Warren
Court is noted for making some of the most liberal advancements in criminal rights during
this time period. The country reached its most conservative on this issue in the late 1980’s
and early 1990’s when the nation was in the full throws of the War on Drugs and crime
rates in the United States were at its highest in three decades (Drews 2003). Mood on
crime has gotten steadily more liberal since the mid-1990’s, perhaps related to the steady
decrease in crime the nation as a whole has experienced in the last 25 years.
Even the wide variation in defense mood (depicted on the bottom row, second panel
from the left) seems intuitive.7 In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s at the height of the Cold
War and on the cusp of the Iranian Hostage crisis and the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan,
the country was very conservative on defense. Mood got progressively more liberal in the
late 1980’s and early 90’s as the Berlin Wall fell, the USSR disbanded, and for the first time
in the 20th century, the United States did not face a major-power enemy. The country
became more conservative in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11/2001 attacks and then
again more liberal as public sentiment turned against the War in Iraq in the late 2000’s.
The second important feature of Figure 2.1 is the difference in public mood across
issue areas in a given year. Take, for example, 1981. While the general mood suggested
that the country was fairly ideologically ambivalent (≈ 52)8, the country was in reality
7It is worth keeping in mind here that Stimson’s data focuses on domestic policy issues
so defense mood primarily assesses feelings on defense spending; more conservative can be
interpreted as support for higher spending and more liberal as supporting spending cuts.
8There is some question as to the substantive interpretation of more moderate values
of mood – scores closer to 50. On the one hand, 50 could indicate a relatively moderate
country that prefers a position that is neither too liberal nor too conservative. On the
other hand, 50 could indicate a highly polarized nation whose preferences are bimodally
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at its most conservative on defense (≈ 30) while being fairly liberal on the environment,
just two years after the Three Mile Island nuclear disaster. In 1992, when the country had
settled into a fairly liberal stance on civil liberties, it was extremely conservative on crime.
The bottom right-most panel of Figure 2.1 plots the range of moods across the issue
area by year. That is, the difference between the country’s most liberal mood minus its
most conservative mood. On average, this range is 25.1 points and is as high as 37.6.
Given that the standard deviation of the general mood measure is 5.5, these differences are
strong and meaningful. The takeaway point here is that there is good empirical reason to
reject the assumption that the public equally prefers a liberal outcome in all cases decided
by the Court in a given year.
Of course, this is only a problem if the general mood measure cannot accurately
capture the variation in mood across issue areas. Another look at Figure 2.1, however,
suggests that general mood only loosely maps onto issue-specific moods. The bottom right
corner of each panel reports the average difference between the policy specific mood and
the unidimensional mood as well as the maximum deviation. Note that the general mood
maps best onto civil liberties, societal welfare, and economics. However, these averages are
still about 1.5 times the standard deviation of mood. By contrast, Stimson’s measure does
a relatively poor job approximating the county’s feelings on criminal rights and government
power where the maximum deviation is 3-4 times the standard deviation of mood.
distributed at the ideological extremes. In either case, however, the signal to the justices is
the same: constraint from the public is low. If public opinion is highly polarized, justices
should have little fear of legislative retaliation against their decisions because consensus is
unlikely. If the country is, as a majority, fairly moderate, the signal to the justice about a
preferred ideological direction is weak. Thus, I remain agnostic between these two possible
interpretations and refer to 50 as ideological ambivalence.
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Armed with this new measure, which allows me to test the influence of issue-specific
policy mood on individual votes, I turn now to the exact data and methods I use to test my
hypotheses about the conditional relationship between public opinion and decision-making.
Data and Methods
Recall my dependent variable is whether a justice casts a counter-attitudinal vote
in a case. In order to construct this variable, it is first necessary to define a justice di-
chotomously as either a liberal or a conservative. While judicial scholars have a wealth of
ideology measures at their disposal, dichotomizing them can be something of a challenge.
One option is to use zero as a cut point for either the Judicial Common Space (JCS) score
(Epstein et al. 2007) or the Martin-Quinn (MQ) scores (Martin and Quinn 2002) where
negative values define a justice as liberal and positive values make a justice a conservative.
However, zero is not itself a meaningful cardinal value in Bayesian ideal points like the
JCS and MQ scores. Perhaps more problematic for my purposes, these scores are unidi-
mensional. In the same way I expect the public to have varied preferences over different
issues, I likewise expect justices to have varied preferences in different cases. Indeed, a
spate of recent literature suggests that not only do these issue variations exist, but they
are meaningful (see Clark and Lauderdale 2012, Forthcoming).9
With these considerations in mind, I use the ideology ranks created by Clark and
Lauderdale (2012) to code whether a justice was expected to be in the left wing (and is
therefore coded as a liberal) or the right wing (and is therefore coded as a conservative)
in each case. Using multiple indices of case similarity (such number of years between two
decisions, the overlap in issues and issue areas, and shared citation variation) they use a
9My results are robust to using the directionality of the standard JCS scores to define a
justice as a liberal or conservative. See Appendix Table A.3.
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kernel-weighted optimal classification estimator to estimate the ideological position of each
justice from most liberal to most conservative.10 The dependent variable, then, equals 1
if a liberal justice voted conservatively (according to the Supreme Court Database) or a
conservative justice voted liberally.
Following Casillas, Enns and Wohlfarth (2011) and others (McGuire and Stimson 2004;
McGuire et al. 2009) I only analyze votes for reversal. Enns and Wohlfarth (2013, 8) note
the problem of the Court’s “affirmation bias” (McGuire and Stimson 2004) when trying
to explain the the ideological output of the Court’s decisions, “the ideological direction
of the Court’s affirmances will be disproportionately more liberal (conservative) as the
Court itself becomes more conservative (liberal).” However, I note that with a couple of
exceptions my results remain largely unchanged if I include all votes in my analysis.
The chief independent variable is countervailing public opinion. In other words, I am
interested in the force of public opinion and the extent to which it disagrees with a justice’s
preferences. Thus, using my issue-specific mood estimates, countervailing public opinion is
coded from most conservative (low values) to most liberal (high values) for conservative and
from most liberal to most conservative for liberal justices. Importantly, this measurement
10These ranks exclude unanimous cases because there is no meaningful ideological vari-
ation in these cases. Also, my analysis excludes the vote of median justice in each case
because she cannot be defined as either a liberal or a conservative. While my results are
robust to including the median as either always liberal or always conservative, excluding
the median justice allows me to make an additional contribution to the literature. Enns
and Wohlfarth (2013) find that the median is uniquely responsive to public opinion. Thus,
that I find evidence of strategic responsiveness to public opinion in the wings of the Court
is an even stronger test of influence as I am only examining the justices who are least likely
to respond to public opinion.
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strategy means that low values of countervailing public opinion can be interpreted as public
opinion that is more in line with a justices’ preference and higher values can be interpreted
as more opposed. I therefore expect the effect of this variable to be positive. Justices
should be more likely to deviate from their own preference as the force of public opinion
grows increasingly against those preferences.11
My hypotheses suggest that the effect of public opinion should be conditioned by three
factors: threat from Congress, case salience, and diffuse support. Following Clark (2011),
I measure Congressional threat as the logistic transformation of the number of pieces of
court-curbing legislation introduced in the past year. While the mere introduction of a
bill does not have a tangible impact on the Court, and is not even necessarily noticed by
the justices, Clark shows that bill introduction serves as a proxy for general disapproval
of the Court by Congress and the American people. Therefore, court curbing legislation
indicates an increased willingness of those bodies to sanction unpopular decisions. Indeed,
Clark (2011) finds that the Court is highly responsive to this signal.
My measure of salience requires a media based approach as our argument is about
salience to the public, not necessarily salience to the justices. While public case salience is
usually measured using Epstein and Segal’s (2000) measure of appearance on the front page
11My argument suggests that justices should be responsive to contemporaneous public
opinion. Justices should be cognizant of, and strategically responsive to, where the public
is when the decision is issued because the contemporaneous public will be the one who
decides whether to accept or reject the Court’s decision. However, I acknowledge that
there is a debate in the literature on the amount of time it takes for justices to be aware
of changes in public opinion and whether the Court should be more likely to respond to
short-term whims or long term trends. As such, I note that the results I present below are
robust to a single-year lag of public opinion as well as a 5-year rolling average.
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of the New York Times, I employ a more nuanced measure developed by Collins and Cooper
(2011) which uses four newspapers and examines stories from all parts of the paper and
during all parts of the decision-making process, from the day the Court grants certiorari
to the date of the opinion announcement. This measure is an advancement because it is
“. . . contemporaneous, replicable, transportable, nondichotomous, and free from systematic
biases. . . ” (Collins and Cooper 2011, 6).
Finally, I measure diffuse support following the strategy taken by Durr, Martin and
Wolbrecht (2000). Taking Stimson’s algorithm as their starting point, they argue that
many individual public opinion questions reflect a component of trust in the Court. Each of
these individual question series probably has its own dynamic but their shared movement
indicates general support. To this end, I update and revise their data. This involves
identifying as many questions as possible that tap into trust in, support for, or approval of
the Court as institution that are asked at least twice and use Stimson’s mood algorithm
to factor analyze them for shared variation. This allowed me to extend Durr et al.’s data
back to 1956 and forward to 2005 (the years of my analysis) and construct a quarterly
measure of diffuse support.12
To test for the conditional relationships posited by my hypotheses, I interact each
of these variables individually with my measure of public opinion. In addition, I control
for a number of other factors that might influence a justices’ decision to deviate from her
preferences. First, I note the potential influence of organized interests (Collins 2008) and
the Solicitor General (Black and Owens 2013) have on decision-making and thus include
12See Durr, Martin and Wolbrecht (2000, 769, footnote 5) for more precise measurement
details. Because justices are likely slow to respond to changes in support, and to ensure
the measurement is truly exogenous, I use a two-quarter rolling average but note that the
results are robust to a 1-quarter lag and a contemporaneous measure.
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controls for the pressure exerted by both: the number of counter attitudinal amicus briefs
files and whether the Solicitor General appeared as an amicus against a justice’s ideological
preference. Finally, a wealth of evidence in the literature suggests that justices often vote
against their policy preferences to be in the majority and either write or assign the majority
opinion (Johnson, Spriggs and Wahlbeck 2005). For example, Ringsmuth, Bryan and
Johnson (2013) find that justices are significantly more likely to change their minds from
their initial inclination on a case in order to be in the majority coalition. Further, justices
may join the majority coalition despite their ideological disagreement with it to simply
avoid the time and resource costs of writing separately (Maltzman, Spriggs and Wahlbeck
2000). Thus I control for whether a justices’ vote puts her in the majority coalition.
Results
Because my dependent variable is dichotomous, I employ a logistic regression. Follow-
ing the intuition of Enns and Wohlfarth (2013) that there are important differences in the
decision-making considerations of justices in different ideological positions on the Court
(the justices closest to the median should rely on a different set of considerations than jus-
tices far in the ideological wings of the Court), I include random intercepts for each rank
position. I operationalize rank position as how far from the median Clark and Lauderdale
estimate a justice to be. In other words, the most conservative (or liberal) justice would
have an ideological extremity of 4, the justice closest to the median on either side would
have a rank of 1.13
Recall that I am interested in the conditional effect of public opinion given three
different moderating variables, thus I begin by examining the direct relationship between
13These results are robust to including random effects for each justice and controlling for
rank position (see Uribe 2012, 10).
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Solicitor General Pressure 0.978* 0.992* 0.973* 1.038* 1.045*
(0.687) (0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070)
Amicus Brief Pressure -0.042* -0.040* -0.034* -0.028* -0.018
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Majority Coalition 0.996* 0.054* 0.995* 0.997* 1.000*
(0.054) (0.995) (0.054) (0.056) (0.056)
Countervailing Public Opinion 0.026* -0.012 0.013* 0.348* 0.276*
(0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.056) (0.050)
Congressional Threat -4.451* 0.064*
(1.083) (0.026)
Public Opinion x Congressional Threat 0.098* -0.346*
(0.022) (0.066)
Case Salience -0.267* -0.345*
(0.063) (0.066)
Public Opinion x Salience 0.005* 0.006*
(0.001) (0.001)
Diffuse Support 0.129* 0.117*
(0.017) (0.019)
Public Opinion x Diffuse Support -0.003* -0.003*
(0.0003) (0.0004)
Constant -3.047* -1.331* -2.260* -17.814* -14.268
(0.222) (0.474) (0.291) (2.024) (2.421)
Wald Chi-Squared 593.84* 620.16* 621.25* 645.13* 687.16*
Observations 14,470 14,470 14,436 13,844 13,810
Table 2.1: Logistic regression of justice’s decision to vote counter to her preferences. Ran-
dom effects by ideological position. Standard errors reported in parentheses. * denotes
p < 0.05 (two-tailed test).
public opinion and attitudinal voting (Model 1 of Table 2.1), then examine the results of
each potential moderator individually (Models 2-4) and, finally, the effect of public opinion
when conditioned by all three constraining variables (Model 5).
I note at the outset that the controls perform largely as expected in each model:
justices are more likely to deviate from their preferences when the Solicitor General appears
as an amicus for the other side, and are more likely to cast a counter attitudinal vote in
order to be in the majority coalition. Only amicus participation is insignificant in the full
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model.14
As the table makes clear, I find robust support for each of my hypotheses. While, in
general, countervailing public opinion has a slightly positive effect on the probability of a
counter-attitudinal vote, this relationship is highly conditioned on Congressional threat,
case salience, and diffuse support. On their own, each variable significantly moderates the
effect of public opinion. When considered in combination, as they are in Model 5, each
interaction is still statistically significant, indicating that the effects of each constraint exert
a unique influence on the effect of public opinion.
For ease of interpretation, Figure 2.2 explore the substantive effect of each of these
moderating variables in the full model. The figure plots the predicted probability of a
counter-attitudinal vote across the range of public opinion pressure when constraint on the
justices is highest (salience and Congressional threat are set at their maximum values and
diffuse support is set at its lowest) in the solid line and when constraint is at its lowest
(dashed lines). All other variables are set at their means and modes, as appropriate.
Recall that low values of countervailing public opinion pressure indicate that a justice
and the country are aligned while high values indicate a divergence between the two. It
should be kept in mind throughout the discussion of the results that the low probability
of casting a counter-attitudinal vote when the public and the justice are aligned (the left
14One possible concern is that some issues, specifically the issues most prominent on the
Court’s agenda, may be driving these results. To ensure that no single issue was responsible
for the results we observe, I ran the full model seven times, excluding one issue in each
iteration. My results remained consistent with the exception of excluding criminal rights
cases where I lose statistical significance on the Congressional threat moderator. This is
unsurprising, however, given that criminal rights cases make up the largest portion of my
data.
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side of the x-axis) is also indicative of public opinion exerting a constraining influence.
On this side of the graph, a justice is voting in line with public opinion when she votes
her preference. However, these points are observationally equivalent; it is impossible to
precisely disentangle the effect of public opinion from the effect of ideological preference
on the left side. High probabilities of a counter-attitudinal vote on the right side of the
graph are the strongest evidence in support of my hypotheses. Here, deviation from public
opinion is explainable by a misalignment between the public and the voting justice.
The far right panel of Figure 2.2 depicts the effect of countervailing public opinion
when Congressional threat is high and low. Note that justices are largely unconstrained by
public opinion when Congressional threat is low. Indeed, public opinion does not have a
statistically significant effect on a justice’s decision to deviate from her preferred outcome
when threat is low. When threat is at its lowest, justices are equally likely (a probability
of about .28) to deviate from their ideology across the range of values of public opinion
pressure. It is only at higher values of Congressional threat where public opinion begins to
act as a constraint. Here, a justice who is aligned with public opinion has a .18 probability
of casting a counter-attitudinal vote. This is significant, given that the baseline probability
of a vote against ideology is about .31. By the time she is the most at odds with public
opinion, on the far right extreme of the x-axis, the probability of following public opinion
and casting a counter-attitudinal vote is .54 – a 75% increase over the baseline and more
than double the probability of her deviating from a position that is both true to her
ideological preferences and to the preferences of the American people. Note, however, that
Congressional threat is the least influential of the three considerations.
I see a similar pattern emerge for case salience in the center panel. In low salience
cases, public opinion has no effect on a justice’s vote. However, when the Court is the
limelight in high salience cases, the effect of public opinion is dramatic. A justice is almost
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certain to vote in line with her preferences when she has the backing of public opinion (p
≈ .08). As she is increasingly misaligned with the preferences of the public, the probability
of a counter-attitudinal vote increases dramatically. Indeed, a justice is seven times more
likely to deviate from her ideology when countervailing public opinion is at its maximum
value.
Turn finally to the far right panel of Figure 2.2 which plots the effect of countervailing
public opinion when diffuse support is high and low. When justices enjoy high levels of
support, the effect of public opinion is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Compare
this to the solid line depicting the effect when diffuse support for the Court is low. Here
again the probability of deviating from a position held by both the justice and the country
is about 1 in 20. That probability approaches near certainty when public opinion exerts
its strongest influence (p ≈ .87). This represents a rather astonishing 135-fold increase,
suggesting that even though the Court is thought to enjoy continuous, high levels of diffuse
support, fluctuations in the supply have major ramifications on voting behavior.
The full effect of these results might be best understood when contrasting two real
world examples. Consider first, Justice Stewart’s liberal vote in New York Times vs. United
States (1971). While Stewart was a relatively consistent conservative voice on the Court,
by 1971 public opinion on civil liberties cases (such as free speech, which was at issue in
the Pentagon Papers case) had taken a turn for the liberal direction. Combine this with
the high salience of the case, an extremely high threat from Congress (court curbing had
reached on of its highest points in history in 1970) and diffuse support for the Court was
near an all-time low. Stewart, who was already the closest conservative member to the
median, was therefore highly responsive to public opinion. The marginal effect of public
opinion on his decision to cast a counter-attitudinal vote in this case was .11; about 3 times
stronger than the baseline marginal effect of .03.
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Compare Justice Stewart’s behavior to Justice White’s vote in a little known gender
discrimination case Johnson vs. Transportation Authority of Santa Clara County (1987).
Like Stewart, White was the most moderate member of the conservative coalition in this
case. Also like in New York Times vs. United States, the country was fairly liberal on civil
rights in 1987. However, this case was not salient and Justice White had the political cover
to vote in line with his conservative preferences that Stewart did not: low Congressional
threat and high diffuse support. Indeed, the marginal effect of public opinion for White in
this case was statistically indistinguishable from zero. The takeaway point is that justices
follow public opinion, but only when they have a concrete strategic incentive to do so.
Conclusion
Judicial scholars have long debated if, and to what extent, the public constrains the
decisions justices make. The nature of this constraint and even whether it exists are foun-
dational questions in the field, and yet these questions remain without firm answers. The
results presented above do much to clarify our understanding of the complex relationship
between the preferences of the American people and the nation’s only unelected branch of
government.
First, I present one of the most nuanced tests to date to uncover a relationship between
public opinion and judicial decision-making. Not only do justices cast majoritarian votes,
but they deviate from their own preference to do so. Moreover, justices are cognizant of,
and sensitive to, changes in public opinion across issue areas. It is difficult to know how
the justices would be able to know and apply something as general as public mood within
the context of the facts and issues present in individual cases, much less to do so with the
conviction that such concerns should trump ideological preferences. Rather, my results
support a more plausible mechanism: the justices, as engaged members of their political
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environment, respond to and are aware of broad categories of public opinion.
Second, the conditional nature of my results lend strong support of the strategic
behavior hypothesis. Not only do justices follow public opinion, but they do so in a way
that helps them maximize a fundamental goal: specific support for their decisions. Justices
are only incentivized to abandon their ideological goals when the probability that they
will face non-compliance with unpopular decisions is high. In essence, these results point
not only to a direct relationship between public opinion and decision-making but help to
disentangle the strategic goals justices have in mind when they follow popular sentiment
and therefore the mechanism by which public opinion influences votes.
Finally, I argue my unique research design will help future scholars examine questions
plagued by observational equivalence in a new way. For example, scholars face some of
the same difficulties when they explore whether the Court is constrained by the separation
of powers, whether panel effects exist on the courts of appeals, and whether members of
Congress are responsive to pressure from constituents. By shifting the focus away from
looking at the simple ideological direction of a vote and towards examining explaining
votes ideology cannot explain we can open a new pathway to examine some of the most
important questions in American institutions. What is more, the decision to vote contrary
to one’s ideology is itself worthy of future exploration. Some of the largest debates in
judicial politics, and in political science more generally, have to do with how elites make
decisions and what factors influence those decisions. In the judicial politics literature alone,
analyzing counter-attitudinal voting can shed light on the difference between the attitudinal
and strategic models of decision-making and the ways in which justices are much more than
ideologues in robes.
Of course, these results are not without their limitations. The model presented here
cannot account for all competing explanations for counter-attitudinal voting. One reason
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this may be troubling here is that past precedents can and do influence public opinion
on an issue (Franklin and Kosaki 1989; Johnson and Martin 1998). Future work should
examine the feedback loop between legal precedent and public opinion that runs contrary
to it.
Further, while this piece attempts to take steps toward establishing a causal link
between public opinion and votes, this link is still not a direct one. What all studies in
this area lack is direct evidence of intentionality on the part of the justice. We can only
infer intention from conditional relationships; the true test is whether justices note public
opinion, follow it, and cite it as a justification for the decisions they make. The best
evidence of intentionality, as yet unexplored by judicial scholars, might be found in justices
private deliberations – from the memos they write to themselves before hearing a case, to
personal notes take at oral argument and conference, to the memos exchanged between the
justices during the opinion writing process – or their public writings. While the search for
intentionality might have to be a largely descriptive and qualitative endeavor, it beckons
to be explored using the rich trove of data now available to the students of the Court.
These limitations aside, the results raise some interesting and important normative
questions. From its conception, citizens and elected officials have worried that the unelected
Court has the ability to make policy decisions with little to no accountability. These results
indicate that the checks and balances, which form the cornerstone of our democracy, work
exactly as they should. Congress’ ability and willingness to overrule the Court and the
Court’s lack of a purse or sword induces majoritarian compliance, especially on the issues
about which the majority most cares. Moreover, these checks seem to work preemptively;
Congress does not have to act on all unpopular Court decisions because the mere threat
of non-compliance induces majoritarian outcomes. That said, these results probably also
advise caution for those who view the Court a watchdog for minority rights. Only when
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the Court feels safe from legislative and public backlash, can it hope to be the last best
hope for minority voices.
Chapter 3
Public Opinion and Setting the
Agenda
Introduction
Whether and why the U.S. Supreme Court acts as a majoritarian institution has been
a cornerstone question in American politics for decades. However, to date, literature in
political science has sought to answer this question exclusively at the merits stage – does
the Supreme Court follow public opinion when deciding how to decide – while ignoring
the impact of public opinion on the other stages of the Court’s decision-making process,
most notably whether the Supreme Court follows public opinion when it decides whether
to decide.
Understanding whether the Court’s agenda is responsive to the will of the American
people has normative as well as empirical importance. While legal scholar Robert Post
once described Constitutional law as an “expression of the deepest beliefs and convictions
of the American Nation” (quoted in Schauer 2005, 10), this can only be true if the High
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Court, as the last voice on Constitutional disputes, is answering the questions that are
most important to the American people. Constitutional law can only accurately reflect
the values of the American people if, as journalist Tim O’Brien wrote, “there is no greater
barometer of what is on the minds of the US population than the docket of the US Supreme
Court” (quoted in Johnson and Goldman 2009, 39).
Moreover, while Schauer (2005) persuasively argues that much of what the Court
decides on a day-to-day basis is not politically relevant to most Americans, that the Court
does act as the final arbiter on the nation’s most important political controversies indicates
not only that the Court does face situations where public opinion is relevant but also that
the relevance of public opinion is likely not static across all cases. Rather, the importance
of public opinion to the Court should ebb and flow with the importance of the cases it
decides to decide. As such, understanding the role of public opinion at the agenda setting
stage is vital to understanding it later in the process.
The Court’s responsiveness to public opinion at the agenda setting stage may also
therefore have meaningful implications for our understanding of the relationship between
public opinion and justices’ votes on the merits. There is more than a decade’s worth
of evidence to suggest that the Court largely decides in the ideological direction of the
public’s mood. If, as I argue below, justices consider the pressure of public opinion as
early as when they are deciding which cases to grant, the congruence we observe between
case outcomes and public opinion may result as much from strategic selection as it does
from the justices bending to the general will. What is more, the political irrelevance of the
majority of the Court’s docket that Schauer (2005) points to could itself be an indication
of judicial responsiveness to public opinion; the justices choose to avoid potential conflicts
with the public by avoiding important cases.
To take a step toward answering these important questions, I take one of the first
44
large-scale empirical looks at the role of public opinion on justices’ agenda setting votes.
I argue and find that justices are forward-looking in their agenda setting votes and avoid
granting cases where their merits votes will put them out of step with the American people.
However, this strategic concern is conditioned by the Court’s reservoir of judicial legitimacy
and justices’ obligation to legal clarity and legal accuracy. By way of preview, I find that
justices are less likely to vote to grant a case as they become increasingly estranged from
public opinion but that public opinion only becomes a consideration when a case is not
overwhelmingly certworthy on legal grounds or when the Court faces low institutional
legitimacy.
In the next section, I draw together the extant literature on the Court’s agenda setting
process and the literature on public opinion and the Supreme Court to develop a theoretical
connection between the two. Section three outlines my data and methods and sections four
and five present and discuss my results.
Agenda Setting and External Constraint
The U.S. Supreme Court is unique among federal institutions in that it sits atop the
only branch of government that cannot build its own agenda.1 The judiciary is not a
self-starting institution. Rather, judges and justices must wait for cases to be brought to
them by litigants. Unlike Congress and the president, the Court cannot use its agenda to
directly shore up support or pursue particular policy objectives. That said, since 1925 the
Court has possessed almost sole discretion over which cases it hears. In essence, while the
1Cox and McCubbins (2005) make the distinction between agenda setting and agenda
building. Agenda setting is the power to prioritize and include or exclude items from the
agenda while agenda building is the power to create new items to place on the agenda.
The Court has the former power, but not the latter.
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Court cannot build its own agenda, it has the power to set it. Choosing which cases to
hear or not hear and when to hear them.
The canonical view in the literature on agenda setting and the Supreme Court has been
that while justices may be strategic in later stages of the process, the Court is generally
focused on the law when deciding which cases to hear. Decades of scholarship on the
determinants of the Court’s agenda have suggested that justices pay attention almost
exclusively to institutional and legal case factors when voting on certiorari. Legal conflict
in the lower courts (Ulmer 1978; Perry 1991; Black and Owens 2009), the involvement of
the Solicitor General and interest groups (Caldeira and Wright 1988; Caldeira, Wright and
Zorn ND), signals from the lower courts such as dissents on the panel, the use of lower
court judicial review, or en banc review (Black and Owens 2009; Owens 2010) all influence
the Court’s decision to grant a case. Indeed, the influence of these variables has been
so validated over so many different studies that the case-level determinants of a grant of
certiorari are arguably the best understood part of the Court’s decision-making process.
The strategic model of decision making posits that justices pursue their policy goals
within the internal constraints of their colleagues’ preferences and the external constraints
of the preferences of other political actors. At the agenda setting stage there is, at present,
limited evidence that justices consider either type of constraint when casting agenda setting
votes.
For example, a formalized strategic account of a justice’s vote to grant suggests she
should look forward to her ideological preferences on the merits and strategically grant cases
when she is closer to the projected merits outcome (usually measured as some variant of the
median justice) and strategically deny cases when she prefers the legal status quo (or the
decision of the lower court) (Hammond, Bonneau and Sheehan 2005). However, anecdotal
evidence (Perry 1991) and more recent empirical scholarship (Benesh, Brenner and Spaeth
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2002) suggest there are limits to this intuition. Epstein, Martin and Segal (2012) add that
if justices are free to pursue policy goals, it is only in cases where the “certworthiness” of
a case is borderline. Most notably, Black and Owens (2009) find that while justices are
forward-looking at the certiorari stage, their ideological preferences take a back seat when
legal or institutional factors strongly counsel a grant. In short, internal constraints matter
only when legal signals are weak.
There is even less evidence that justices respond to external constraint at the agenda
setting stage. Epstein, Segal and Victor (2002) find limited support for a relationship
between the long-term dynamics of the Court’s agenda and congressional preferences; the
Court grants fewer statutory cases when it is more out of step with Congress. However,
even Epstein and her colleagues note that their results are limited to explaining broad
aggregate trends in the data. When Owens (2010) examined all existing spatial models
positing a separation of powers constraint on the Court’s agenda, he found no evidence that
justices respond to the preferences of Congress at all when deciding what to decide. Even
the well-documented evidence of the influence of the Solicitor General at the cert. stage
is more likely a result of a signal of case importance than it is the result of the strategic
influence of the executive (Caldeira, Wright and Zorn ND; Black and Owens 2009).
It provides important context to note, however, that the evidence of a separation of
powers effect at the merits stage is also mixed. Segal (1997), Sala and Spriggs (2004), and
Spriggs and Hansford (2001) all suggest that justices merely vote their sincere preferences
at the merits stage and, occasionally, those preferences align with the will of the elected
branches and thus any apparent relationship between the two is congruence rather than
constraint. Indeed, even scholars who find there is a separation of powers effect at the
merits stage suggest that the effect is mediated through some other source. For instance,
Clark (2009) finds the Court is less likely to invalidate a piece of federal legislation when
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there is a higher rate of bills introduced in Congress to curb the Court’s power. Clark
argues that rather than directly responding to the threat of Court curbing, justices take
increased negative attention by members of Congress as a signal it is out of step with the
American people and its legitimacy may be in danger. In short, Clark finds that the Court
responds to Congressional threat out of its concern for the preferences of the American
people.
Clark’s findings highlight a salient tension in the judicial politics literature. While
there is little concrete evidence of a separation of powers effect either at the agenda setting
stage or at the merits stage, there is a wealth of literature to suggest justices respond to
public opinion.
While some studies suggest justices are merely influenced by the same prevailing winds
of ideological change that effects public opinion McGuire and Stimson (2004); Giles, Black-
stone and Vining (2008) and others suggest justices are directly constrained by public
opinion (Casillas, Enns and Wohlfarth 2011; Hall Forthcoming), nearly every study that
has examined the relationship between public opinion and the ideological direction of the
Court’s decisions has found that the Court is largely a majoritarian institution.
That there is a strong demonstrated effect of public opinion as a constraint on the
Court at the merits but not a strong effect of the separation of powers has important
implications for justices’ considerations of the constraints of public opinion at the agenda
setting stage. I turn now to exploring that implication and developing a series of expec-
tations concerning when and how justices should respond to public opinion when choosing
which cases to hear.
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Public Opinion and Agenda Setting
My theoretical argument starts from the familiar premise that justices pursue their
policy goals within the bounds of certain internal and external constraints (Murphy 1964;
Epstein and Knight 1998; Hammond, Bonneau and Sheehan 2005). At the agenda set-
ting stage, this means justices look forward to the likely merits disposition when deciding
whether to grant a case. However, as I outline above, the ideological preferences of a
justice’s colleagues are not the only potential constraint that may affect the ideological
direction of the merits; justices must also consider the pressure put on the Court by public
opinion.
While justices have a number of incentives to consider public opinion, these incen-
tives can generally be categorized as concern for diffuse support and concern for specific
support. Diffuse support is the Court’s legitimacy and the public’s trust in the Court as
an institution. The American people, Gibson and Caldeira (1992) argue, have a positivity
bias toward the Court. “[P]reexisting institutional loyalty [to the Supreme Court] shapes
[public] perceptions of and judgements about court decisions and events” (Gibson and
Caldeira 2009b). In essence, the higher the level of diffuse support the Court enjoys, the
more the public is willing to accept the Court’s decisions, even those decisions with which
it disagrees. Thus, justices have an incentive to shore up diffuse support (see Casillas, Enns
and Wohlfarth 2011).
Alternatively, justices may also respond to public opinion to garner specific support, or
public approval for individual decisions (see Hall Forthcoming). The Supreme Court has no
power to implement its decisions and relies on the elected branches (who are theoretically
acting as agents of their constituents) to do so. Thus, when the Court issues unpopular
decisions, it risks those decisions being either reversed by the elected branches or merely
ignored by the American people. Justices, then, pay a direct cost when there is a loss of
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specific support. Moreover, more recent work (Bartels and Johnston 2013) suggests that
specific support can crystalize into diffuse support. The more the Court’s decisions align
with the preferences of the American people, the more the American people put their faith
in the Court (Durr, Martin and Wolbrecht 2000), and thus, the more incentive the Court
has to issue majoritarian decisions (Casillas, Enns and Wohlfarth 2011).
If justices are forward-looking at the agenda setting stage, as the literature suggests
they might be, justices should avoid granting cases where their preferences over the merits
would be at odds with the American people. This is especially true given that my findings
in Chapter 2 suggest that justices actually vote counter to their ideological preferences in
response to the pressure of public opinion in order to shore up diffuse support for their
decisions. Thus, justices should seek to grant cases where their preferences are aligned
with public opinion, which allows them to simultaneously pursue their ideological goals
and garner high levels of diffuse and specific public support. Thus, I hypothesize:
General Hypothesis: Justices should be less likely to vote to grant a case
where their preferences are at odds with public opinion.
In essence, my overarching hypothesis suggests that the justices engage in defensive
agenda setting, avoiding those cases that will force a conflict between the Court and public
opinion and seeking cases they can use to bolster support for the Court without forcing
them to deviate too much from their own ideological preferences.
However, the importance of diffuse and specific support is not static over time. Rather,
it changes with the the level of support the Court currently enjoys. If levels of diffuse sup-
port are high, justices have less of a need to issue popular decisions because its preexisting
institutional legitimacy tends to shield it from backlash against unpopular decisions (Gib-
son and Caldeira 1992, 2009b).
Additionally, justices pay an ideological cost when they deny a case. Reversing a
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distasteful lower court decision moves the policy away from the lower court’s ideal point
and towards the justices’. Affirming a favorable lower court ruling expands the jurisdiction
of the policy nationally. Justices, then, get utility from both. As such, justices should only
be responsive to the need to deny cases to avoid conflict with the public when that conflict
would be most costly. In other words:
Diffuse Support Hypothesis: Justices should be most responsive to public
opinion when diffuse support is low.
Further, my theory suggests justices’ responsiveness of public opinion is fundamentally
about the pursuit of policy goals. Justices seek out cases that will allow them to pursue
their policy goals and avoid cases where they will face external constraint. Because public
opinion acts as a constraint on policy goals, I expect justices to face the same limitations on
their pursuit. This means following public opinion should be a secondary goal for justices
at the agenda setting stage, activated only when justices are not faced with overwhelming
legal factors in a case counseling a grant. This expectation follows Epstein, Martin and
Segal (2012) who argue that justices are only free to pursue policy goals when other factors
do not warrant a clear grant or clear denial, and Black and Owens (2009) who add that
justices are less likely to cast policy-seeking votes at the agenda setting stage when faced
with strong jurisprudential signals. Thus, I expect:
Legal Constraint Hypothesis: Justices should be the least responsive to
public opinion when legal factors strongly recommend a grant.
This hypothesis suggests a moderating relationship. Empirically, I expect a stronger
effect of public opinion on the decision to grant when legal factors favoring a grant are
absent but little to no effect of public opinion when these factors are present and, thus, in
cases where the Court is always more likely to grant.
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Finally, while justices can bolster diffuse support by issuing majoritarian decisions,
they pay a cost to diffuse support when they dodge important issues. Justices, then,
understand that deciding some issues may be so important that they would pay a larger
price for avoiding them than the ideological cost they will pay for deciding against their
own policy preferences in favor of public opinion on the merits. Moreover, Baum (2006)
emphasizes justices pursue multiple goals. Often the goal to achieve legal clarity is more
important than their own policy goals. Highly salient issues heighten the importance of the
former goal, thereby diminishing the importance of the latter goal. In other words, issue
salience can overwhelm a justice’s ideologically defensive strategy at cert. More formally:
Issue Salience Hypothesis: Justices should be more likely to grant a case
as the public salience of the issue increases.
It is worth noting that this hypothesis posits a direct effect of issue salience rather
than a moderating effect. Justices should always be more likely to grant highly salient
issues regardless of how far their preferences are from prevailing public opinion.
Data and Methods
To test my hypotheses, I rely on Owens’ (2010) data of 542 cert. petitions that made
the Supreme Court’s discuss list from the 1953 to 1993 terms. 2 The important features
of these data are that they cover an extended time period and can therefore capture the
2These data are limited to cases emanating out of the federal courts of appeals and only
include cases where the Court was being asked to interpret or invalidate a piece of federal
legislation. The potential drawback to these data is the concern that justices should be
especially responsive to public opinion when interpreting federal statutes (see Clark 2009).
However, that Owens (2010) finds no evidence of a separation of powers effect indicates
that justices are not uniquely concerned with a fear of legislative reversal in these cases
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Court’s response to variation in public opinion over time, and they include denied petitions.
The dependent variable equals one when a justice votes to grant a case.
One of the key challenges in the study of public opinion at the individual case or vote
level is developing an issue-specific measure of public opinion. Most previous studies use
the measure of public mood developed by Stimson (1999) which estimates a unidimensional
mood of the nation on a 0 to 100 (very conservative to very liberal) scale. However, this
measure is ill-suited for my question as it treats public opinion as the same across issue areas
and thus across cases in a given term. In other words, it assumes that the country would
equally prefer a grant in all liberal decisions in a term – from economics, to civil liberties, to
defense. However, recent work (see Coggins et al. ND; Rice Forthcoming) finds that there
is actual meaningful variation in American public opinion between issues. In a given term,
the country might be relatively conservative on, for example, civil rights but quite liberal
on economics. Thus a liberal justice should feel comparatively more comfortable granting
an economics case and should be more likely to defensively deny a civil rights case. To
account for this important variation, I utilize the re-estimated issue-specific mood outlined
in Chapter 2. This measure disaggregates Stimson’s policy mood into seven unique issue
areas: civil rights, criminal rights, defense, economics, the environment, societal welfare
issues, and governmental power. I argue these issue areas are narrow enough to encompass
– thus they should not uniquely be concerned with specific support. This is especially
true given that cases involving landmark pieces of Congressional legislation are no more
or less likely to be granted by the Court. Moreover, these cases run the gamut of issues
from environmental legislation to government regulation, to civil and criminal rights. In
other words, because the topics of federal legislation vary so widely there is little reason to
believe the public would be more interested in or more concerned about these cases than
cases that implicate state law.
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issue-level variations in public opinion but broad enough that justices could be reasonably
expected to be generally aware of public opinion.
The chief independent variable of interest for these two hypotheses asks whether jus-
tices are likely to disagree with prevailing public opinion. Thus, it also requires a measure
of the likely ideological position of the justice in that issue area. Like public opinion,
the standard measure of judicial ideology (Martin and Quinn 2002) is unidimensional. As
with the public, one could reasonably expect justices to desire different outcomes on an
economics case than on a civil rights case. Thus, to predict a justices likely ideological
preference on those issues, I again rely on Clark and Lauderdale (2012) case-specific ide-
ology ranks, which code whether a justice was expected to be in the left wing (and is
therefore coded as a liberal) or the right wing (and is therefore coded as a conservative) in
each case. Using multiple indices of case similarity (such as number of years between two
decisions, the overlap in issues and issue areas, and shared citation variation) they use a
kernel-weighted optimal classification estimator to estimate the ideological position of each
justice from most liberal to most conservative. Of course, I cannot use the ideological rank
for that case because the ranks were only constructed for granted cases and most cases in
my data set were denied. Rather, I calculate which wing the justice was more likely to
be in in the previous term. For instance, if Clark and Lauderdale estimated that a justice
would be in the left wing in 6 of 8 civil liberties cases in the past term and in the right
wing in two case, I coded the justice as a liberal. This measure has the dual advantage of
being issue-specific and not being based directly on contemporaneous votes.3
3This approach is not without its limitations, of course. Chiefly, my measure must
dichotomize a justice as preferring a liberal or conservative outcome. Like almost all dum-
mied proxy variables, I lose important variation in how frequently a justice was predicted
to be a liberal or conservative in the past term. In other words, a justice who fell in the
54
My measure of public opinion, then, actually measures the strength of countervailing
public opinion. In other words, I am interested in the force of public opinion and the
extent to which it disagrees with a justices preferences. Thus, using my issue-specific mood
estimates, countervailing public opinion is coded from most conservative (low values) to
most liberal (high values) for conservative and from most liberal to most conservative for
liberal justices. This measurement strategy means that low values of countervailing public
opinion can be interpreted as public opinion that is more in line with a justices’ preference
and higher values can be interpreted as more opposed. I therefore expect the effect of this
variable to be negative.
To measure diffuse support I again follow the strategy taken by Durr, Martin and
Wolbrecht (2000). Taking Stimsons algorithm as their starting point, they argue that
many individual public opinion questions tap the same latent concept of trust in the Court
as an institution. The shared movement in the dynamics of the individual question series,
then, can be measured to tap into public opinion in the same way Stimson measures
liberal wing in 51% of cases in the previous term is treated the same as a justice who was
predicted to be a liberal in 91% of cases. Also, justices who were ranked on either side
of the median are treated as liberal or conservative as justices who are predicted to be in
the tails of their respective wings. In short, my measurement strategy does not account
for ideological extremity. That said, the results I present below are largely robust to using
the directionality of a justices’ Judicial Common Space Score as the definition of liberal or
conservative. It is also worth noting that interacting a justices’ average extremity in the
issue area from the past term (i.e. how many ranks away a justice was, on average, from
the median) is not significant. In other words, a justices’ ideological extremity does not
appear to affect her responsiveness to public opinion. The results of both of these models
can be found in the Appendix (see Tables A.4 and A.5).
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the shared movement in mood. To this end, I update and revise the Durr, Martin and
Wohlbrecht (2000) data and identify as many questions as possible that tap into trust in,
support for, or approval of the Court as an institution that are asked at least twice and
use Stimsons WCALC algorithm to factor analyze them for shared variation and construct
a yearly measure of diffuse support.4 Because I expect the relationship between diffuse
support and public opinion pressure to be conditional, I interact the variables.
To measure issue salience, I rely on the Policy Agendas Projects dataset of yearly av-
erages of the Gallup “Most Important Problem” index. After recoding the Policy Agendas
Project’s broad issues into my 7 issue categories, I use for the measure of public opinion and
judicial ideology, the variable simply represents the proportion of respondents who labeled
that issue as the most important facing America. While this number could theoretically
range between zero and one, in my sample the maximum is .5. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
defense was, on average, the nation’s most important issue. That being said, there is a
fair amount of variation across the salience of the issue areas over time. Even issues as
seemingly obscure as government power or the environment had years where as many as 4
or 5% of Americans listed them as the most important problem facing the United States.
The highest level of salience any issue received was Civil Rights, where nearly half of those
polled in 1955 and again in 1963 listed it as the most important issue.
I also control for the host of factors the literature suggests influence cert. votes (fol-
lowing the measurement and coding in Owens [2010]) whether there was a dissent on the
lower court panel, the involvement of the Solicitor General, the extent of interest group
involvement measured as the number of amicus briefs filed.
4Because justices are likely slow to respond to changes in support, and to ensure the
measurement is truly exogenous, I use a one year lagged measure of this variable but note
that the results are robust to a 2 year lag and a contemporaneous measure.
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I follow Black and Owens (2009) and define the chief legal constraints the Court faces
as whether the court of appeals exercised judicial review, the existence of lower court
conflict, and whether the case implicated a landmark piece of legislation (which I use here
as a proxy for legal salience given that their proxy, coverage in U.S. Law Week is not
available for all the years in my analysis). I then factor analyzed these variables using
principle components analysis to create a single index of Legal Constraint, standardized
the variable to range from zero to one, and interacted this index with countervailing public
opinion.5
Finally, I control for the ideological preferences of the justices. Following past work
(Black and Owens 2009; Owens 2010) I conceptualize a justice’s sincere preference in
relation to the median on the Court (the expected policy location if a case is granted)
and the legal status quo, or the median on the lower court panel (the expected policy
location if a case is denied). To construct this variable, I took the absolute value of the
difference between a justice’s Judicial Common Space (JCS) score and the term median
on the Supreme Court and the absolute value of the difference between the voting justice’s
JCS score and the median on the lower court panel. I then differenced these distances
to construct a comparative distance variable. In short, higher values on the ideological
distance variable indicate a justice was ideologically closer to the status quo than to the
median and would therefore be more likely to prefer a denial.6 While this variable would
5The results I present below are substantively similar if I instead include each of these
variable individually and interact them. While the judicial review and landmark legislation
variable fall out of significance, the conflict variable resembles the relationship I present
with the factor index. The results for the other variables remain unchanged. I present
these results in the Appendix at Table A.6.
6These results are robust to a dummy variable specification where for whether the jus-
tice’s sincere preference would be for a grant. This value takes on a 1 if a justice’s judicial
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ideally also be issue specific, comparable preference estimates for the Supreme Court and
courts of appeals are not available beyond the unidimensional JCS scores.
Because public opinion is the same within an issue area in a given term (and thus
all cases implicating that issue in a given term take on the same value of public opinion)
and because the case level controls do not vary within a case across the individual votes, I
expect the errors to be clustered at the term-issue level and at the individual case level. I
therefore employ a three-level mixed effects logistic regression model with votes nested in
cases nested in term-issues.
Results
The results of the model above are presented in Table 3.1. I note at the outset that
a likelihood ratio chi-square indicates that the multilevel model performs better than the
naive model. I also note, consistent with past work, that the controls perform as expected.
Justices are significantly more likely to vote to grant certiorari when there is dissent in the
lower courts, and when more amicus briefs are present and less likely to vote to grant when
the Solicitor General files a brief opposing certiorari. I also find, consistent with Black and
Owens (2009) that justices are more likely to vote to grant as their preferences get closer
to the term median than to the median of the lower court panel.
The heart of my argument suggests that as justices face increasing public pressure,
they should be more risk averse and thus be more likely to vote to deny a case. As
Table 3.1 demonstrates, this is exactly what the data suggest. However, consistent with
my hypotheses this relationship is not direct. Rather, the Court’s level of diffuse support
and the certworthiness of the case condition the impact of public opinion on a justice’s vote.
common space (JCS) score (Epstein et al. 2007) was closer to the median justice than to
legal status quo.
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Coefficient Standard Error
Ideological Preference for Grant -1.533* 0.226
Amicus Briefs 0.455* 0.137
Lower Court Dissent 0.895* 0.267
SG Opposes Grant -0.735* 0.278
Public Issue Salience 9.751* 2.751
Public Opinion Pressure -0.509* 0.144
Certworthiness 1.749 2.042
Diffuse Support -0.215* 0.0646
Pressure x Diffuse Support 0.004* 0.001
Pressure x Certworthiness 0.092* 0.040
Constant 23.273* 7.510
Observations 3303
Log Likelihood -1531.488
Random Effects Parameters Estimate Standard Error
Groups in First Level (Term Issues) .460* .225
Groups in Second Level (Cases) 2.050* .135
Random Effects LR Test Chi Square 727.57*
Table 3.1: Mixed effects multi-level logistic model of a justices’ vote to grant certiorari.* indicates
p < .05
Because logistic regressions are non-linear, the substantive interpretation of interactions are
best understood graphically.
Consider first, Figure 3.1. The top panel depicts the probability that a justice will
vote to grant certiorari when trust in the Court is low (the solid line) and when trust in the
Court is high (the dashed line).7 Recall that low values of public opinion pressure indicate
that the public and the justice are relatively aligned (a conservative justice backed by a
relatively conservative nation or a liberal justice on an issue with liberal public opinion)
and as the values increase the public and justice become increasingly misaligned. When
diffuse support is one standard deviation below the mean, justices are highly responsive
7Values are plotted at one standard deviation above and below the mean level of diffuse
support. All other values are held at their means or modes, as appropriate.
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to public opinion. When they have the backing of the public (and thus are likely to cast
a majoritarian vote on the merits) all else equal they have a .76 probability of voting
to grant the case. This is the best case scenario for justices; they can vote in line with
their preferences and the preferences of the public and, in so doing, hope to avoid any
further damage to the Court’s institutional legitimacy and perhaps even help to buttress it.
However, the probability of a grant decreases rapidly as the justice and the country become
increasingly misaligned. That same justice, when faced with extreme public pressure has a
probability of voting to grant a case of a little over .1, representing a notable 88% decrease.
Compare this to the dashed line, depicting the probability of a vote to grant when the
Court enjoys high levels of diffuse support. Here, the effect of public opinion is substantively
nominal and statistically insignificant. In other words, justices who seek to bolster the
institutional legitimacy of the Court by voting to grant cases where they believe they will
vote in line with public opinion on the merits are only compelled to do so when diffuse
support is low. When the Court enjoys high levels of diffuse support, public opinion is
functionally irrelevant.
The bottom panel of the figure plots the differences in the marginal effect of public
opinion when diffuse support is high and when it is low and the grey shaded region depicts
the 95% confidence interval around the difference.8 Note that for all values of public
opinion, the difference in slopes are statistically significant. While the most pronounced
differences occur when the public and the justice are highly aligned – in a sense indicating
that justices are more willing to seek out cases when they agree with public opinion than
they are to avoid cases when they disagree with it – the difference is still significant when
8Differences calculated for each value of a one-unit change in pubic pressure. To present
the most stringent test of the significance of the interaction, the difference are taken at the
minimum and maximum values of diffuse support.
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Figure 3.1: Top panel: Predicted probability justice votes to grant certiorari when the
Court experiences high (dashed line) and low (solid line) levels of diffuse support. The
rug plot along the bottom of the figure depicts the distribution of public opinion pressure
in the data. Bottom panel: Difference in the marginal effect of public opinion at high
and low diffuse support. Grey shaded region indicates 95% confidence interval around the
difference.
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the public and the justice are opposed.
Taken together, the results of Figure 3.1 indicate not only that justices are forward-
looking and responsive to public opinion at the agenda setting stage but they also point to
one motivating force behind that responsiveness: the need to maintain diffuse support for
the Court. Justices, my results suggest, understand the opportunity cost of defensive case
selection and are most willing to pay those costs when the Court’s institutional legitimacy
is in danger.
However, Figure 3.2 indicates that strategic institutional and ideological goals are
often secondary to legal goals. Here again, the top panel depicts the predicted probability
of a vote to grant in a highly legally certworthy case (the dashed line) and a case where no
legal factors compel a grant (the solid line).9 While this result is less pronounced than the
results for diffuse support, the figure clearly demonstrates that certworthiness conditions
the effect of public opinion.
When a number of legal factors (such as legal conflict in the lower courts, the use of
judicial review by the lower courts, or the consideration of a landmark piece of congressional
legislation) compel a grant, a justice is always more likely to vote to grant the case, despite
the pull of public opinion. This supports Epstein, Martin, and Segal’s (2012) intuition and
Black and Owens (2009) findings that not only are justices primarily motivated by the legal
factors in a case when deciding whether to grant it, but that secondary goals, including
ideological and institutional goals, are only relevant when legal factors do not give the
Court clear direction. The effect of public opinion is both statistically and substantively
insignificant in highly certworthy cases. That being said, the dashed line in the top panel
9Values are plotted at the minimum value and one standard deviation above and below
the mean level of certworthiness. All other values are held at their means or modes, as
appropriate.
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Figure 3.2: Top panel: Predicted probability justice votes to grant certiorari with a legally
important case (dashed line) and legally unimportant case (solid line). The rug plot along
the bottom of the figure depicts the distribution of public opinion pressure in the data.
Bottom panel: Difference in the marginal effect of public opinion at high and low cert-
worthiness. Grey shaded region indicates 95% confidence interval around the difference.
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of Figure 3.2 indicates that when the law does not force a justice’s hand, justices are
strategically responsive to public opinion. When the public and the justice are aligned in a
legally unimportant case, justices still have a .35 probability of voting to grant, even though
the case lacks good legal reason for them to do so. This effect diminishes substantially as
the justice faces high levels of pressure from public opinion. In a case where a justice is
likely to vote against strong public opinion on the merits, the model predicts the justice
has less than a .1 probability to vote to grant a legally insignificant case – a 74% decrease.
The bottom panel of the figure demonstrates,10 however, that the difference in marginal
effects only become significant when the public and justice become increasingly opposed.
Two conclusions can be drawn from Figure 3.2. First, consistent with decades worth of
research on Supreme Court decision making, legal importance is the single most important
predictor of a justice’s vote at the agenda setting factors and the law has the power to
overwhelm strategic considerations. That said, justices make strategic calculations when
the law does not provide clear direction – strategically seeking out cases where their ideology
would lend itself to a majoritarian decision on the merits and avoiding cases that are likely
to produce conflict with the American people.
Consider finally, Figure 3.3, which plots the effect of public issue salience on a justice’s
decision to grant a case. Despite Schauer’s (2005) assertion that the Court deals with issues
that are only tangentially related to public awareness, and thus is less politically relevant,
justices are highly responsive to issue salience when deciding which cases to grant. Cases
dealing with issues that few if any Americans would consider the most important issue
facing the United States (which make up the majority of both the Court’s docket and
the cases the Court is asked to hear) have an approximately .14 probability of receiving
a grant vote from a justice. As salience increases, and a greater proportion of Americans
10Again, depicting the difference at the minimum and maximum levels of certworthiness
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Figure 3.3: Predicted probability of a vote to grant as the public salience of the issue
increases. The rug plot along the bottom depicts the distribution of public issue salience
in the data.
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report they are deeply concerned by the issue, the probability of a vote to grant increases
substantially – more than 3-fold from the minimum to maximum value of issue salience. It
is perhaps particularly noteworthy that this effect is not conditioned on public opinion.11
Justices respond to the public’s signals that an issue is important to them despite the
probability that a justice might disagree with public opinion on the merits. This suggests
justices largely ascribe to Justice Brandeis’ famous quip that, in important issues, “it is
usually more important that the rule of law be settled, than that it be settled right”
(dissenting opinion, DiSanto vs. Pennsylvania [1927]).
Conclusion
The results above take some of the first steps toward expanding our understanding of
the effect of public opinion on judicial decision-making. On the whole, the results suggest
that not only are justices cognizant of public opinion on the merits of a decision, but that
understanding the constraints they may face from public opinion at the latter stages of
the decision-making process, justices strategically consider public opinion when deciding
which cases to decide.
Of course, like any piece of research, the findings I present above are not without their
limitations. While my theory suggests that justices act out of concern for both diffuse
and specific support, they cannot disentangle the effects of these motivations nor can they
explain the relative importance of each. Rather, they merely serve to suggest that when
diffuse support for the Court is low, justices respond by granting cases where they are more
likely to issue decisions that will be more likely to enjoy specific support.
Moreover, the model only considers the choice of individual justices. It therefore
11Because I hypothesize that the effect of issue salience should be direct, I do not interact
it with public pressure. However, I note that when included, this interaction is insignificant.
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assumes that justices will vote their sincere preferences on the merits and be forward-
looking to those preference. However, we know from past research that justices understand
that the majority disposition will likely fall to the median justice. Thus it is possible that
when justices consider the constraint of public opinion they do not consider public opinion
in relation to their own preference but rather public opinion in relation to the median
justice. My model does not consider this possibility and it is a fruitful avenue of future
research.
These limitations aside, these findings could have important implications for future
work. Chief among them, the results suggest the potential for a selection effect in our
understanding of the effect of public opinion at the merits stage. It is possible that rather
than the Court directly responding to public opinion, observed congruence between public
mood and the ideological disposition of the case is a result of strategic docket control
– justices choose to grant cases where their preferences align with public opinion. As
Kastellec and Lax (2008, 408) write,
[t]he precise selection strategy employed by the Justices will effect the
set of Supreme Court cases we observe. . . Legal scholars and others have
long been concerned [that]. . . the cases the Justices hear are not representa-
tive. . . Accordingly, the Court’s selection process raises the potential for selec-
tion bias in the inferences we draw from its cases.
They advise that the first step toward recognizing this selection bias is to understand the
process the Court employs during the selection stage. Thus, this research takes important
steps to understanding the relationship between public opinion and the Court’s outputs.
Chapter 4
Public Opinion and Stare Decisis
Introduction
The U.S. Supreme Court, as the nations highest court and the court of last resort,
plays a role far more important than merely deciding individual cases. It is responsible
for the direction of the rule of law in the United States. Much more than adjudicating
individual conflicts, the Courts norm of stare decisis allows it to set legal rules and legal
policy for the entire federal judiciary and often for state courts as well.
In essence, stare decisis, which translates from Latin to “to stand by things decided”
allows the Supreme Court to set precedent for future cases. The legal rules that are
applied from case to case rely on interpretation and reinterpretation of past cases. Thus,
understanding when and why the justices choose to apply precedent is vital to our broader
understanding of the Court’s policy-making power and American legal development.
However, the norm of stare decisis, is just that: a norm. The decision of how, or
even whether, a past case applied to a present case is entirely discretionary on the part of
the justices. As such, the exploration of the Court’s use of precedent in the literature has
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focused on internal ideological and institutional explanations, largely ignoring the potential
for external constraint. To this end, I explore the role of public opinion on the Court’s
treatment of its own precedent over time. Fundamentally I ask if the Court is more prone
to positively (negatively) treat cases as those decisions become more (less) popular.
Whether justices consider public opinion when deciding which precedents to consider
and apply has important implications for our understanding of the role of external con-
straint on the development of jurisprudence. Perhaps more importantly, however, it sheds
light on justices’ motivations for considering public opinion in the first place.
Because citation to precedent is largely unobserved by anyone but legal scholars and
lower court judges, finding evidence of public opinion as a constraint on this aspect of the
Court’s decision-making process would suggest that the justices respond public opinion for
more than strategic purposes. It would provide evidence that justices view consistency
with public opinion as a valuable end in itself rather than, or at least in addition to, a
mere strategic consideration. Alternatively, if external factors play a role in the Court’s
more public decisions, as I have demonstrated elsewhere in this dissertation, but not in
the content of the Court’s opinions, it indicates that justices follow public opinion to be
noticed. In the same way that theory would dictate that justices should be more likely to
follow public opinion in salient cases because those are the cases the public is most likely to
be aware of, we may also expect justices to have little need to care about public opinion in
the treatment of precedent because decisions are rarely read or understood by the public.
Indeed, by way of preview that is exactly what I find. The Court is neither directly
influenced by public opinion when deciding how to treat precedent nor does public opinion
conditionally influence it. I find no effect of public opinion on the decision to treat precedent
even when conditioning the effect on the salience of the treated case, the Court’s level of
diffuse support, nor the level of threat posed by Congress. In short, while justices may be
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highly responsive to public opinion in the more conspicuous aspects of its decision-making,
they seem to largely ignore public opinion when applying or creating legal rules.
In the next section I draw on previous literature on the Court’s application of precedent
and the influence of public opinion on the Court to theorize, and derive specific hypotheses
about the relationship between the two. In section three I describe the data and methods I
employ to test these hypotheses, and sections four and five present and discuss my findings.
The Politics of Precedent and Public Opinion
The Court’s norm of stare decisis is one of the most important and most persevering
institutions in the American legal system. Fundamentally, stare decisis ensures there is
consistency in the law over time. It elevates the decisions justices make in individual cases
to rules rather than mere dispute resolutions.
Moreover, stare decisis symbolizes that the Court speaks with one voice and that
its decisions transcend the opinions of any individual justice or court. Indeed, it is the
institution of stare decisis, and the symbols it projects, that serve to ordain the Court as
a natural and just arbiter above the fray of politics and ideology (see Gibson and Caldeira
2009a,b; Gibson 2010); stare decisis is often seen as the foundation of the Court’s legitimacy
(Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001; Baum 2006).
That being said, despite the importance of stare decisis, justices can and do deviate
from precedent (Landes and Posner 1976; Segal and Spaeth 2002; Spriggs and Hansford
2001, 2002; Hansford and Spriggs 2006).1 In a famous dissent in Hertz vs. Woodman
(1932) Justice Brandeis wrote, “the rule of stare decisis. . . is not inflexible. Whether it
shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely within the discretion of the Court.”
1For a relatively exhaustive history of the justices view of stare decisis over time, and
the role of stare decisis in the modern Court, see Strandler (2009).
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Brandeis furthered, in a dissent in Burnet vs. Colorado Oil and Gas (1932) that “stare
decisis is not, like the rule of res judicata, a universal inexorable command.” This quote
alone has been cited by the Court more than a dozen times in the years since Brandeis
first wrote it as explanation for deviating from past precedent in a number of salient issues
from abortion (Planned Parenthood vs. Casey [1992]), to gay rights (Lawrence vs. Texas
[2003]), to the Establishment Clause (Agostini vs. Felton [1997]) (Strandler 2009, 25).
True to Brandeis’ notion, the decision to cite a case at all, much less how to cite a case,
is completely discretionary (Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Black 2011; Spriggs and Hansford
2002).
The canonical view of the decision to cite past precedent states that justices largely
respect the norm of stare decisis but do so because they recognize it as a constraint in the
pursuit of their ideological goals. In other words, while the decision to cite a case and how
to cite a case is ideological in nature (justices positively cite that with which they agree,
and ignore or disparage decisions with which they disagree) they recognize that some cases
are so jurisprudentially or legally important that they must be followed despite ideological
predilections. Empirically, this relationship has been operationalized as an interaction
between a justice’s ideological distance from a past case and the vitality of the precedent,
or “the extent to which [the precedent] maintains legal authority” (Hansford and Spriggs
2006, 23).
Under this view, precedent functions both as a tool and a constraint – justices aligned
with a past case can work to strengthen the subsequent legal rule it created through
further citation, while justices opposed to a precedent can work to subtly weaken it. The
cornerstone of this line of research relies on the notion that positive citation strengthens
a precedent, making it more vital, while negative citation weakens it; the more justices
deviate from a legal rule, the weaker the rule becomes.
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Because of the highly discretionary nature of citation to precedent, scholars have
largely studied precedent as an internal phenomenon. Whether when exploring the at-
tributes of a case that increase its vitality over time (Black and Spriggs 2013), exploring
how ideology interacts with vitality in the construction of legal rules (Hansford and Spriggs
2006; Fowler et al. 2007), or examining how stare decisis binds the lower courts to the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court (Benesh and Reddick 2002; Hansford, Spriggs and Stenger
2013) scholars have largely ignored the external political forces justices face when applying
precedent.
There are several reasons to believe that justices might consider public opinion when
crafting and applying legal rules. The decision to cite a given case is not made in isolation;
it is not simply the endorsement or rejection of a legal rule in an individual case. Rather,
precedent can be thought of as a proxy for the ideological development of jurisprudence in
the United States at a macro level. Consistent endorsement of conservative legal rules on
an issue through their application to present cases may serve as an even stronger indication
of conservative movement on an issue than even the preponderance of conservative case
outcomes. Thus, the wealth of literature compiled over the last 50 years that suggests the
Courts ideological output is largely consistent with the mood of the country (Marshall 1989;
Mishler and Sheehan 1993; McGuire and Stimson 2004; Giles, Blackstone and Vining 2008;
Marshall 2008; Casillas, Enns and Wohlfarth 2011; Hall Forthcoming) might naturally point
to a relationship between public opinion and the legal rules laid down by the precedent the
Court choses to endorse or reject.
Moreover, there are issues upon which we might expect justices to view public opinion
as a valuable guide for the development of jurisprudence. In other words, there are issues
upon which the Court views the public as a source of authority. This is fundamentally the
idea underlying the conception of a “Living Constitution”: Americans’ understanding and
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beliefs about their own rights ought to be instrumental in defining them. In other words,
this belief suggests that the Constitution itself is an instrument to democracy and therefore
the “correct” interpretation of the Constitution should be responsive to the democratic will.
Justice Stephen Breyer in his book Making Our Democracy Work furthers that justices have
an obligation to “[help] ensure that the Constitution remains ‘workable’ in a broad sense
of the term. Specifically, [they] can and should interpret the Constitution in a way that
works for the people of today” (Breyer 2011, 73). There is also an abundance of anecdotal
evidence to suggest that the Court frequently views public opinion as the correct source
of jurisprudential authority when evaluating rights claims. For example, the dominant
standards for obscenity and for what constitutes a “religion” protected by the Free Exercise
Clause both come from popular consensus. Likewise, there are a number of landmark cases
the Court has decided in recent years where a dispositive factor for the decision was the
public’s understand of what their rights were including Justice O’Connor’s justification for
reaffirming the core holding of Roe vs. Wade (1972) in Planned Parenthood vs. Casey
(1992) and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s justification for reaffirming Miranda Rights (even
though he vehemently disagreed with the decision in Miranda) in Dickerson vs. United
States (2000).
One might therefore expect a direct effect of public opinion on a justice’s decision to
follow, or deviate from, existing precedent. In other words, I posit
General Hypothesis: As the country becomes increasingly liberal (conserva-
tive) the Court should more positively cite liberal (conservative) decisions and
be more prone to negatively cite conservative (liberal) decisions.
Of course, as I have shown throughout the earlier chapters of this dissertation, we
might not expect justices to be equally concerned about public opinion in all cases. That
is to say justices respond to public opinion because they are incentivized to do so to garner
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either specific support for individual decisions or diffuse support for the Court. As the need
to shore up each type of support increases or decreases, so theoretically should the Court’s
responsiveness to public opinion. Following the insights gleaned from earlier chapters, I
posit that three indicators could condition the relationship between public opinion and
judicial decision-making.
First, justices rely on diffuse support, or the trust in, and the legitimacy conferred to,
the Supreme Court by the people. The nation’s positivity bias in favor of the Supreme
Court facilitates the public’s acceptance of unpopular decisions (Gibson and Caldeira 1992,
2009b; Staton 2010). In essence, the more diffuse support the Court enjoys, the less need
it has to issue popular decisions. Alternatively, a growing body of literature suggests that
specific support can crystalize into diffuse support (Durr, Martin and Wolbrecht 2000;
Hetherington and Smith 2007) . The more the Court issues popular decisions, the more
the public tends to trust the Court as an institution and thus accept the occasional decision
that runs contrary to the consensus gentium. Thus, when the Court faces a relative crisis
of confidence with the American people, diffuse support can be augmented by decisions
that align with public opinion. This leads me to posit,
Diffuse Support Hypothesis: Public opinion should have a stronger effect
on the decision to positively or negatively cite a case when diffuse support for
the Court is low.
Second, justices are concerned with specific support for decisions. As the Court can
neither fund nor enforce its decisions, it must rely on the publicly elected branches to see
its policies enacted into law. In other words, the Court relies on specific support for its
decisions to be implemented. Thus, the Court should be particularly responsive to public
opinion when the threat that decisions will not be complied with is highest. Akin to my
findings in the previous chapters, there are two conditions where I expect justices to be
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particularly responsive to public opinion in the quest to shore up specific support: salient
cases, and when Congressional threat is high.
First, the public can only hold the Court accountable for decisions of which it is aware.
Schauer (2005) correctly points out that the vast majority of the Court’s agenda deals with
issues that the public knows and cares little about. There is little reason to believe that
the Court should respond to public opinion when either the public does not have a strong
opinion on the issue or, more commonly, the public will not notice the outcome of the
decision one way or the other. Alternatively, in highly salient cases, justices should be
more responsive to public opinion because these are the cases that the public is most
likely to be aware of and most likely to mobilize against unpopular decisions (Ignagni and
Meernik 1994; Meernik and Ignagni 1995; Ignagni and Meernik 1997; Ignagni, Meernik
and King 1998). This should be especially true in the decision to cite a salient case in
subsequent cases. In the same way the Court relies on other famous sources to strengthen
potentially weak or objectionable decisions (Corley 2008; Corley, Howard and Nixon 2005;
Sorenson and Johnson 2013), the Court gets more purchase relying on well-known cases
as justification for its decisions than it would from citations to cases about which the
public has heard little. Following or disparaging Roe vs. Wade (1972) in an abortion case
would likely give the Court far more credibility for a decision than a reference to the much
lesser-known Doe vs. Bolton (1972). As such, I expect:
Salience Hypothesis: Public opinion should have a stronger effect on the
decision to positively or negatively cite a case as the public salience of the cited
case increases.
Finally, I expect justices to be especially responsive to public opinion when threats
from Congress are high. A growing body of literature suggests that justices strategically
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craft decisions to ensure compliance from the lower courts (Corley and Wedeking Forth-
coming; Corley, Collins and Calvin 2011) and Congress (Owens, Wedeking and Wohlfarth
2013). In the same way that Owens and his colleagues find that justices try to obfuscate
in their opinions to avoid Congressional review from unfriendly ideological regimes, I hy-
pothesize justices will be more likely to rely on popular precedent to justify their decisions
when Congress sends signals, in the form of introduction of Court-curbing legislation, that
the Court is out of step with public opinion. Thus, I expect
Congressional Threat Hypothesis: Public opinion should have a stronger
effect on the decision to positively or negatively cite a case as when Congres-
sional threat is highest.
The preceding factors might especially influence the justices’ decisions to cite cases
because citations provide justifications for policy decisions. As I allude to above, the
Court’s reputation and legitimacy benefits from the norm of stare decisis. When justices
can rely on popular decisions to defend and rationalize their decisions, thus making them
seem legal in nature, rather political, the Court only increases the likelihood those decisions
will be accepted and followed.
On the other hand, however, citations to precedent are some of the least visible, or
at least some of the least paid attention to, components of decision-making. Indeed, even
Hansford and Spriggs (2006, 26) concede that the mass public is not cognizant of the
Supreme Court’s use of precedent (see also Baum 2006; Baum and Devins 2010). The
public and the vast majority of political elites likely do not even read the Court’s opinions
and instead rely on media or scholarly accounts to understand the content of individual
decisions. This presents an interesting tension where finding no support for the hypotheses
above may in fact give us more insight into the reasons justices follow public opinion and
the effect of public opinion as a constraint on decision-making. Precedent sets legal rules,
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but the vast majority of Americans largely ignores its use.
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in the Affordable Care Act cases is just one example of
the fact that the American people notice the result in a case much more than they notice the
application of the legal rules. Roberts’ decision was heralded as a victory for the Left, as it
upheld President Obama’s crowning legislative achievement. However, many legal scholars
point to the decision as a strategically brilliant move in favor of Roberts’ conservative
ideology by substantially restricting the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause (see
Mariner, Glantz and Annas 2012). Roberts was able to issue a decision in line with public
opinion, and against his ideology, while using little-noticed interpretation of precedent to
pursue his broader ideological goals.
Justices, therefore, can use precedent to justify and forward their strategic aspirations.
Indeed, some scholars have gone so far as to say precedent merely serves as window dressing
to legitimize justices’ ideologically driven decisions (Segal and Spaeth 1993, 2002). Even
federal appeals court Judge Richard Posner regards most uses of precedent as little more
than smoke and mirrors. In an interview with long-time Supreme Court reporter Linda
Greenhouse, Judge Posner quipped,
There is a tremendous amount of sheer hypocrisy in judicial opinion-writing.
Judges have a terrible anxiety about being thought to base their opinions on
guesses, or their personal views. To allay that anxiety, they rely on the appa-
ratus of precedent and history, much of it extremely phony . . . (quoted in Segal
and Spaeth 2002, 85).
Under this alternative view, precedent provides one avenue where the justices can see
their policy preferences enacted into law in a broad scheme, even when those preferences
deviate from public opinion, without having to face the broader political consequences of
issuing counter-majoritarian decisions. Thus, I test an alternative hypothesis that:
Null Result Hypothesis: Despite the influence of public opinion on more
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visible portions of the Court’s decision-making, public opinion should have no
influence on the Court’s treatment of precedent over time.
I turn now to the data and methods I use to test these competing interpretations.
Data and Methods
Fundamentally, my hypotheses question what drives the Court to positively or nega-
tively interpret its precedent over time. To test these hypotheses, then, I began by con-
structing a database consisting of every citation by a federal or state Court to a Supreme
Court precedent since 1791. This database, which contained over 11 million observations,
was constructed by collecting the Shepard’s Citation Report r for each case decided by
the Supreme Court since it started issuing written decisions, and using a Python script to
parse them for their content.2 Shepard’s Reports are “a legal citation index that, among
other things, provides a list of all U.S. court opinions that refer to any U.S. state or federal
case decided since the beginning of the U.S. legal system. Importantly, Shepard’s also
indicates how a particular court opinion is legally interpreted by the subsequently decided
cases that cite it” (Hansford and Spriggs 2006, 43-44).3 Shepard’s reports have been con-
sistently used in the literature as a valid data source by scholars interested in citations to
and treatment of precedent (see e.g. Segal and Spaeth 2002; Spriggs and Hansford 2001,
2002; Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Fowler et al. 2007; Hansford, Spriggs and Stenger 2013).
The next step was to collapse the database into the proper unit of analysis. The unit
2I owe a great debt to Jim Spriggs for his help and advice on the construction of this
database, which was modeled largely on the database originally constructed for his 2006
book.
3For a discussion of Shepard’s coding protocol and the reliability, validity, and potential
drawbacks of these data see Hansford and Spriggs (2006, 44-50).
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of analysis in the models I present below is a dyad between each precedent (which I will
refer to as a cited case) and each subsequent Court term. In other words, the model allows
for the possibility of any case to be cited in each year after it was initially decided. For
example, a case decided in 1972 would include an observation for 1973, 1974, and so on
through 2011.4
The dependent variable, then, is a count of the number of positive or negative citations
to that precedent in each of the subsequent years. Following previous work (Hansford and
Spriggs 2006, chapter 4), I run separate models for positive and negative interpretations
of precedent.
Before continuing on to the independent variables I include in the model, the definition
and measurement of positive and negative interpretation of precedent is worth a bit of
further explanation. A positive interpretation of precedent, according to Shepard’s coding
scheme requires that a treating case rely on a cited case as the “controlling authority”
on the issue. Positive interpretations of precedent theoretically strengthen its vitality by
applying the same legal rule in subsequent cases. Following Hansford and Spriggs (2006),
I define a case as being positively interpreted when a Shepard’s codes a treating case as
having “Followed” cited case.5
Alternatively, negative treatments of precedent attempt to distance the treating case
from the cited case and, in essence, weaken its vitality. Shepard’s codes denoting a negative
treatment include: “Distinguished” (the cited case is “different either in law or in fact” from
the treating case), “Criticized” (the “soundness of the decision or reasoning is criticized”),
4My analysis is limited, because of data availability, to cases decided in or after the 1953
term and ends in the 2011 term.
5I also included as positively treated cases Shepard’s coded as “extended” or “parallel.”
Both of these codes indicate that the treating case fully applied the cited case but these
codes did not exist when Hansford and Spriggs constructed their original dataset.
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“Limited” (the treating case refuses “to extend the decision of the cited case beyond the
precise issues involved”), “Questioned” (the treating case questions the “soundness or
reasoning in the cited case”), or “Overruled” (the treating case “expressly overruled or
disapproved” of the cited case) (Shepards Citations Reports Codebook. 1993, 12-13).
My hypotheses suggest that the Court should be more prone to positively cite liberal
cases when the country becomes more liberal on an issue and more prone to negatively cite
conservative cases as the country grows more liberal. To test this hypothesis, I employ my
issue-specific measure of public mood. This measure, which is describe in more detail in
the earlier chapters, uses Stimson’s (1999) corpus of every domestic policy public opinion
question asked in the latter half of the 20th century and re-estimates his yearly measure
of policy mood based on seven unique issue areas: civil rights, criminal rights, defense,
economics, the environment, government power, and social welfare. I then categorized
each of the more than 5200 cited cases as implicating primarily one of these issue areas.
The measure of public opinion actually measures the strength of countervailing public
opinion, how conservative the country is given a liberal case and how liberal the country
is given a conservative case. In other words, I am interested in the force of public opinion
and the extent to which it disagrees with the ideological direction of the cited case. The
Supreme Court Database codes each decision issued since 1946 as either liberal or con-
servative in outcome. Countervailing public opinion is then coded from most conservative
(low values) to most liberal (high values) for conservative cases and from most liberal to
most conservative for liberal cases. This measurement strategy means that low values of
countervailing public opinion can be interpreted as public opinion that is more in line with
the outcome in the cited case and higher values can be interpreted as more opposed. I thus
expect the effect of this variable to be negative in the positive citation model and positive
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in the negative citation model.6
For the models testing my conditional hypotheses, I interact countervailing public
opinion with case salience, Congressional threat, and the Courts level of diffuse support
in the previous term. These variables are measured in the same way as I describe in
previous chapters. Following Clark (2011) I measure “Congressional Threat” as a logistic
transformation of the number of pieces of court-curbing legislation introduced in the House
or the Senate in the past year. Case salience requires a media-based measure. To this end,
I again employ Collins and Cooper (2011) data indexing the cases salience based on the
amount of and location of coverage in four major national newspapers. Finally, I include
my updated version of Durr, Martin, and Wohlbrect’s (2000) measure of diffuse support
for the Court which uses Stimson’s algorithm to construct a single measure of institutional
6A slightly different take on this theoretical story might instead counsel examining how
much public opinion has changed over time. This story would argue that the Court does
not look at whether contemporary public opinion supports or opposes the legal policy set
forth in a decision, but rather attempts to gauge how far public opinion has come since
the decision was issued – if the times have changed and thus the decision should too.
To examine this possibility, I replicated the models I present in the text but instead of
including a variable for public opinion pressure against a decision, I included a variable
for the absolute value of the difference between public opinion the year a cited case was
issued and public opinion on that issue in the treating year. These results are presented in
the appendix. Importantly, I find substantially the same null result in these models as the
ones I present below. There is neither a direct effect of public opinion drift, as I call the
variable, nor a conditional effect of public opinion drift considering the case salience, level
of diffuse support enjoyed by the Court, or threat posited by Congress. These results are
presented in the appendix Table A.7.
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support for the Court using as many public opinion questions as possible which tap into
trust in, support for, or approval of the Court as an institution.
To test for the possibility of both a direct effect or a conditional effect of public opinion
on the positive or negative treatment of precedent, I present four separate count models:
two models each for positive interpretation and negative interpretation of precedent, one
each that includes only the direct effect of public opinion and one each for the effect of
public opinion conditioned on salience, threat, and support.
The vast majority of cases receive no substantive interpretation at all; the count data
are highly over-dispersed. Indeed, 91% of the observations for positive treatment and 93%
of the observations for negative treatment equal zero on the dependent variable. Thus, I
employ a negative binominal regression.7
Following Hansford and Spriggs (2006) I control for a number of other factors that
could potentially influence the treatment of a precedent over time. Most importantly, I
control for the interactive effect of ideological distance and precedent vitality. Specifically,
using Martin and Quinn’s (2002) data, I measure the absolute value of ideological distance
from the median in the majority coalition of the cited case to the term median in each
7It is possible the data are systematically zero inflated. In other words, there is separate
process determining whether a case even had the potential to be substantively than that
which governs how many times a case is treated. In this scenario a zero-inflated nega-
tive binomial model would be more appropriate (Zorn 1998). In order to account for this
possibility, I ran identical models to those presented below using a zero-inflated negative bi-
nomial specification that models the “hurdle process” separately as a function of precedent
age, the Court’s agenda, whether the case was overruled, and case vitality. The results of
this alternative specification are substantively identical to the ones I present below. These
results are available in the appendix Table A.8.
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year.8 Precedent vitality is measured as the difference between the number of prior positive
interpretations of a precedent minus the number of negative interpretations. Thus, higher
values indicate a more authoritative precedent (see Hansford and Spriggs 2006, 60-61).
To ensure that the variable is exogenous, I lagged vitality one year. I then interacted
ideological distance and vitality.
Hansford and Spriggs also control for whether the cited case included a special con-
currence (concurring only in the result, rather than fully with the legal reasoning), was a
per curiam opinion, the amount of interest group involvement in the cited case (measured
as the number of amicus briefs filed at the merits stage), whether the Solicitor General was
involved, the vote margin in the cited case, and whether the cited case had been previously
explicitly overruled by the Supreme Court. I follow their work and include each of these
controls. I also control for the natural log of total number of past interpretations a cited
case has received by the Supreme Court, the number of cases in that issue area on the
Court’s docket in the treating term (theoretically justices would have more opportunity to
treat a case in a given issue area the more cases they decide in a term implicating that
issue), and both the age of the precedent and the squared age of the precedent.9
8Several recent theoretical (Carrubba et al. 2011) and empirical (Clark and Lauderdale
2010) articles suggests that the median in the majority coalition is a more accurate ap-
proximation of the ideological position of the majority opinion than either the ideology of
the term median or the ideology of the opinion author. It would be better, of course, if the
term median values were issue specific, as justices’ ideologies probably vary from issue to
issue in the same way public opinion does, but such ideology measures are not currently
available.
9Hansford and Spriggs (2006) find, through experimentation, that the relationship be-
tween precedent age and treatment of precedent is quadratic.
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Results
I begin the discussion of my results by examining only a direct effect of countervailing
public opinion on the decision to positively or negatively treat a case in a given year.
Table 4.1 provides the results of the model described above. While the control variables
perform largely as they do in Hansford and Spriggs’ earlier model, the most salient finding
is that countervailing public opinion has no statistically significant direct effect either on
the decision to treat a precedent as controlling or on the decision to negatively treat a
precedent. Indeed, the while the coefficients on the key independent variable of interest
in both models are in the expected direction, they are both statistically insignificant and
substantively nominal.
At first glance, these results may not be surprising. After all, in the same way that we
would not expect the Court to be equally responsive to public opinion in all cases, it might
be equally reasonable that we would not expect the Court to be responsive to public opinion
equally in all issues over time. If justices respond to public opinion for strategic incentives,
then the conditional need to seek out those incentives (diffuse and specific support) might
make a direct effect seem insignificant when, in fact, the effect is just being masked by the
conditional nature of the relationship. Table 4.2 presents the same model while interacting
countervailing public opinion with diffuse support, case salience, and Congressional threat.
As Table 4.2 makes clear, public opinion likewise has an insignificant effect on treat-
ment of precedent over time when accounting for the potential conditioning effect of sup-
port, salience, or threat. All three interactions are insignificant in both the positive and
negative interpretation models. Contrary to the hypotheses outlined above, the Court is
not more or less likely to respond to public opinion in highly salient cases, when diffuse
support is low, or when Congressional threat is high. Indeed, public opinion does not
appear to play a role in the Court’s citation to its own precedent no matter the salience of
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Positive Cites Negative Cites
Ideological Distance .04315* .0848*
(.0170) (.0204)
Case Vitality .0146* -.0051*
(.0013) (.0007)
Case Vitality x Ideo. Distance -.0038* .0010*
(.0007) (.0005)
Special Concurrence -.0123 -.0234*
(.0076) (.0098)
Vote Margin .0024 .0006
(.0032) (.0039)
Logged Number of Prev. Treatments 1.733* 1.747*
(.0183) (.0173)
Court Agenda .0035* .0032*
(.0012) (.0015)
Amicus Involvement -.0025 .0037
(.0025) (.0030)
SG Involvement .0437 -.0632*
(.0229) (.0248)
Per Curiam Opinion -.1355* -.0804
(.0634) (.0616)
Case Overruled .0680 .8729*
(.0622) (.0634)
Precedent Age -.1658* -.0631*
(.0040) (.0050)
Precedent Age2 .0015* .0001
(.0001) (.0001)
Case Salience -.0419* .0095
(.0045) (.0050)
Countervailing Public Opinion -.001 .0014
(.0010) (.0013)
Observations 180,029
Log pseudoikelihood -71,129.19 -57,548.56
Alpha 2.408* 2.296*
Table 4.1: Negative binomial regression of number of positive (left column) or negative (right
column) citations to precedent in a year. Robust standard errors clustered on term-issue. * indicates
p < .05
.
the citing case or the broader political context.10
10There is some debate in the literature as to whether the insignificance of the coefficient
on the interaction term itself is sufficient to conclude an insignificant interactive effect
(Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006). It is far outside of the scope of this work to wade
into that debate but out of an overabundance of caution I take the strategy suggested by
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Extension: Treatment of Precedent in the Majority Opinion
I argue throughout the bulk of my dissertation that the best way to study the strategic
decision-making of various actors is at the individual level. For the most part, “the Court”
does not make decisions, as it is not an actor itself, but is rather composed of nine individual
actors making individual strategic decisions. As Justice Holmes famously quipped “the
Court” is really just “nine scorpions in a bottle.” As a result, while the analyses I present
above, which model the aggregate number of citations to a precedent in a given year, give
a strong indication that justices do not view public opinion as a constraint when they
interpret precedent over time, it is an aggregate test that treats the Court as a unitary
actor and is therefore limited in its generalizability.
To present a more nuanced test of my theory, I extend these analyses to examine a
justice’s decision to treat a precedent in a given majority opinion. To begin, I randomly
selected 1500 orally-argued majority opinions decided between the 1953 and 2011 terms.11
I then constructed a dataset including an observation for each cited case/citing case dyad;
the unit of analysis is whether any given precedent is cited in any given majority opinion.
Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) and plot the difference in marginal effect of counter-
vailing public opinion across the range of the variable at the highest and lowest values of
the conditioning variables: salience, threat, and support. If the confidence intervals around
the differences do not overlap zero at any point, the interaction is statistically significant
at least at that value of countervailing public opinion. For the sake of brevity, these figures
are presented in the appendix (see Figures A.1 and A.2). It is worth noting here only that
the interaction of all three variables is insignificant at all values of countervailing public
opinion in both the positive and the negative citation models.
11Because of data availability, I do not examine citations to any cases decided before
1953.
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Theoretically, a majority opinion could cite any precedent decided prior to the day that
majority opinion is issued.
The dependent variable, then, equals one if the majority opinion treats a precedent
(positively in the positive treatment model and negatively in the negative treatment model)
and zero otherwise. The controls largely remain the same as the models I present above
with a few exceptions. First, I measure ideological distance as the absolute value of distance
between the median in the majority coalition of the treating case and the median in the
majority coalition of the cited case.
I also include variable to assess the potential similarity between the cited and treating
case. While theoretically a majority opinion could cite any case decided prior to the
opinion announcement, some cases are simply more relevant than others. To tap into
potential relevance, I construct a series of similarity dummies equaling one when the cited
and citing case: implicate the same broad Supreme Court Database issue, implicate the
same narrow Supreme Court Database issue, implicate the same issue under my 7-issue
public opinion coding scheme, or involve the same major, or minor, legal provision. I then
constructed an additive index of these dummies to create a “case relevance index.” This
variable ranges between 0 (no overlapping issue area or legal provision) and 5 (complete
overlap).
Finally, I include a dummy variable for if the cited and treating cases were decided in
the same ideological direction; positive citations should be more likely when the cases share
an ideological outcome and negative citations should be more likely when the treating case
and cited case are decided in opposite directions.
As with the previous models, I present both the direct effects of countervailing public
opinion and the effect of public opinion conditioned on threat, salience, and diffuse support.
The results from these four models are presented together in Table 4.3.
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Across all four models, the pattern of insignificance holds. While there is some weak
evidence of a direct effect of countervailing public opinion on whether a case is positively
cited in the majority opinion and an effect of countervailing public opinion conditioned on
cited case salience for negative treatment, neither is substantively very large and, when
plotted out, the interactive effect of salience and public opinion is not even statistically sig-
nificant for vast majority of the range of countervailing public opinion.12 The insignificance
of the these models is even more striking considering that due to the unit of analysis, the
model include nearly 2 million observations and should, therefore, have extremely strong
statistical power.
Indeed, it would seem to be the case that even an opinion author’s decision to cite
any given precedent largely ignores the constraint of public opinion. Justices are no more
likely to rely on conservative precedents as the country becomes more conservative and are
no more likely to disparage conservative precedents as the country grows more liberal.
Conclusion
While all statistical results should be interpreted with a level of caution, and causality
should never be inferred solely from the existence of a statistical relationship, even more
caution should be used when interpreting null results as proof of a lack of relationship.
Null results can only tell us that the statistical relationship between two variables does
not significantly differ from zero in one particular model specification with, as is always
the case, imperfect data. That interpretation is a long way from being able to definitely
conclude that public opinion does not impact justices decision to treat precedent. However,
that no relationship exists under any of the model specifications I present above is at least
an initial indication the public opinion does not have the same sway over the Courts opinion
12See appendix Figure A.3.
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content that it does over the justices’ decision to vote to grant a case or to deviate from
their ideologies on the final votes on the merits.
Taken at face value, then, these results point to a number of important implications.
Chief among them is that while the Court seems to respond to public opinion in the more
visible portions of its decision-making process, precedent appears to be one avenue where
the justices are not constrained to be majoritarian. Rather, because the American people
largely ignore the legal content of the Court’s opinions, the Court’s opinions seem to be
free to ignore the American people.
This finding is of little normative importance if, as some scholars have suggested, stare
decisis is little more than “phony” window-dressing meant to veil ideological decisions. It
makes sense that justices would not be concerned about justifying their decisions to the
mass public with a reliance on popular past decisions if the public will never read those
justifications. If all that we are concerned with is the direction of the Court’s decisions,
then the preceding chapters indicate that the Court is relatively majoritarian, especially
in pursuit of its own strategic goals.
The normative story is more troubling, however, if we instead conceptualize precedent
as creation and application of legal rules – as a proxy by which we can observe the very
development of law in the United States. Under this view, that justices consider majori-
tarian views in the ideological outcome of cases but not in their legal reasoning, which
“can have more far-reaching consequences by altering the existing state of legal policy and
thus helping to structure the outcomes of future disputes” (Hansford and Spriggs 2006, 3),
could imply that the Court is majoritarian in little more than appearance. Justices shore
up diffuse support by issuing individual decisions that have little consequence outside the
parties involved but are free to pursue their ideological goals in the broader legal rules they
establish.
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In essence, if scholars ascribe to the belief that it is the content of the Court’s opinion
that is most important (Maltzman, Spriggs and Wahlbeck 2000; Clark and Lauderdale
2010) these results cast a shadow of doubt over the normative importance of the public’s
views to the Supreme Court.
In a more optimistic frame, however, the Court was established to be a counter-
majoritarian institution and to be protected from what Hamilton called the “great beast”
of public opinion which is “prone to sudden breezes of passion.” These results, then, have
the potential to suggest that, at least through Hamilton’s lens, the Supreme Court really
is the “least dangerous branch.”
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Positive Cites Negative Cites
Ideological Distance .0542* .1216*
(.0179) (.0237)
Case Vitality .0154* -.0057*
(.0015) (.0007)
Case Vitality x Ideo. Distance -.0047* .0008
(.0009) (.0007)
Special Concurrence -.0046 -.0220*
(.0077) (.0100)
Vote Margin .0031 .0053
(.0032) (.0045)
Logged Number of Prev. Treatments 1.731* 1.718*
(.0198) (.0186)
Court Agenda .0032* .0079*
(.0011) (.0020)
Amicus Involvement -.0047 -.0130*
(.0026) (.0037)
SG Involvement .0263 -.0469
(.0215) (.0259)
Per Curiam Opinion -.0999 -.0150
(.0642) (.0661)
Case Overruled .0925 .9123*
(.0680) (.0698)
Precedent Age .0016* -.0701*
(.0040) (.0067)
Precedent Age2 .0015* -.00002
(.0001) (.0001)
Public Opinion Parameters
Countervailing Public Opinion -.0258 .0130
(.0257) (.0336)
Case Salience -.0057 .0209
(.0227) (.0263)
Public Opinion x Case Salience -.0008 .0001
(.0004) (.0005)
Congressional Threat -.5483 .2745
(.4133) (.5353)
Public Opinion x Threat .0077 -.0073
(.0081) (.0091)
Diffuse Support -.0094 -.0139
(.0104) (.0150)
Public Opinion x Support .0002 -.0001
(.0002) (.0003)
Observations 153,397
Log pseudoikelihood -62,285.39 -51,374.166
Alpha 2.107* 2.143*
Table 4.2: Negative binomial regression of number of positive (left column) or negative (right
column) citations to precedent in a year, including interactive effects. Robust standard errors
clustered on term-issue. * indicates p < .05
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Effect of Public Opinion on Majority Opinion Treatments
Variable Positive Pos. Conditional Negative Neg. Conditional
Control Variables
Ideological Distance -.0998 -.1232 .2540* .2113*
Case Vitality .0021 .0014* -.0238* -.0242*
Case Vitality x Ideo. Distance -.0027* -.0034* .0072* .0080*
Special Concurrence -.0849 -.0629 -.0147 -.0162
Vote Margin .0560* .0521* -.0078 -.0173
Logged Number of Prev. Treatments 1.023* 1.077* .8088* .8211*
Similarity Index 1.172* 1.168* 1.099* 1.082*
Same Ideo. Direction .5284* .5605* .0037* .0034*
Amicus Involvement .0324* .0292* .0270* .0235*
SG Involvement .0002 -.1240 -.1755 -.1744
Per Curiam Opinion -.1772 -.1229 .1098 .0980
Case Overruled -.2342 -.1740 .8827* .7552*
Precedent Age -.1650* -.1872* -.1450* -.1536*
Precedent Age2 .0019* .0024* .0014* .0018*
Public Opinion Parameters
Countervailing Public Opinion .0204* .1666 -.0100 .1173
Case Salience -.0456 -.4150* .0158 .5764
Public Opinion x Case Salience -.0012 -.0115
Congressional Threat 2.495 -4.304
Public Opinion x Threat -.0326 .1045
Diffuse Support .0808 .0365
Public Opinion x Support -.0014 -.0010
Constant -12.712* -21.462* -10.176* -14.807*
Log Pseudo-Liklihood -2,852.18 -2,607.25 -3,124.46 -2,910.4
Observations 2,217,183 1,931,762 2,217,183 1,931,762
Table 4.3: Logistic regression model of citation to past precedent in majority opinion. * indicates
p < .05 (standard errors omitted but available upon request). Robust standard errors clustered on
term-issue.
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Appendix A
The tables and figures below present the results of a number of robustness checks described
in the text and footnotes of the results presented throughout my three empirical chapters.
Coefficient Standard Error
Solicitor General Pressure 1.355* 0.082
Amicus Brief Pressure -0.015 0.011
Countervailing Public Opinion 0.215* 0.053
Congressional Threat -3.918* 1.455
Salience -0.354* 0.073
Diffuse Support 0.093* 0.021
PO x Congressional Threat 0.085* 0.029
PO x Salience 0.006* 0.001
PO x Diffuse Support -0.002* 0.0004
Constant -10.345* 2.676
Wald Chi-Squared 431.86*
Observations 10752
Table A.1: Logistic regression justice’s decision to vote counter to her preferences including
only votes for the majority coalition. Random effects by ideological position. * denotes
p < 0.05 (two-tailed test).
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Coefficient Standard Error
Solicitor General Pressure 0.959* 0.052
Amicus Brief Pressure -0.005 0.009
Majority Coalition 0.974* 0.055
Countervailing Public Opinion 0.283* 0.029
Congressional Threat -0.104 0.797
Salience 0.0002 0.0008
Diffuse Support 0.116* 0.011
PO x Congressional Threat 0.007 0.016
PO x Salience 0.0002 0.0008
PO x Diffuse Support -0.003* 0.0002
Constant -14.737* 1.496
Wald Chi-Squared 693.63*
Observations 13994
Table A.2: Logistic regression justice’s decision to vote counter to her preferences using
Policy Agendas Broad Issue Areas. Random effects by ideological position. * denotes
p < 0.05 (two-tailed test).
Coefficient Standard Error
Solicitor General Pressure 1.009* 0.074
Amicus Brief Pressure -0.004 0.010
Majority Coalition 0.867* 0.058
Ideological Extremity -2.252* 0.177
Countervailing Public Opinion 0.068 0.051
Congressional Threat -3.486* 1.367
Salience -0.363* 0.069
Diffuse Support -0.001* 0.0004
PO x Congressional Threat 0.069* 0.027
PO x Salience 0.006* 0.001
PO x Diffuse Support -0.001* 0.0004
Constant -4.513* 2.580
Wald Chi-Squared 632.42*
Observations 13810
Table A.3: Logistic regression of justice’s decision to vote counter to her preferences defining
liberal and conservative using direction of Judicial Common Space scores. Because there
is no clear corollary to rank position in the JCS scores, I instead control for ideological
extremity (the absolute value of the JCS score) and include random effects by voting justice.
* denotes p < 0.05(two-tailed test).
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Coefficient Standard Error
Ideological Preference for Grant -1.462* 0.214
Amicus Briefs 0.471* 0.134
Lower Court Dissent 0.840* 0.263
SG Opposes Grant -0.629* 0.274
Public Issue Salience 9.882* 2.719
Public Opinion Pressure -0.310* 0.119
Certworthiness 5.049* 1.431
Diffuse Support -0.145* 0.055
Pressure x Diffuse Support 0.003* 0.001
Pressure x Certworthiness 0.024 0.024
Constant 14.233* 6.331
Observations 3652
Log Likelihood -1696.7262
Random Effects Parameters Estimate Standard Error
Groups in First Level (Term Issues) .478* .222
Groups in Second Level (Cases) 2.067* .133
Random Effects LR Test Chi Square 837.58*
Table A.4: Robustness check using cardinal direction of JCS score to define liberal or conservative
expectation. * indicates p < .05
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Coefficient Standard Error
Ideological Preference for Grant -1.364* 0.232
Amicus Briefs 0.463* 0.138
Lower Court Dissent 0.899* 0.269
SG Opposes Grant -0.741* 0.280
Public Issue Salience 9.731* 2.761
Public Opinion Pressure -0.509* 0.145
Ideological Extremity -0.091 0.317
Certworthiness 1.799 2.042
Diffuse Support -0.216* 0.065
Pressure x Ideological Extremity -0.001 0.006
Pressure x Diffuse Support 0.004* 0.001
Pressure x Certworthiness 0.093* 0.040
Constant 23.672* 7.535
Observations 3303
Log Likelihood -1526.0494
Random Effects Parameters Estimate Standard Error
Groups in First Level (Term Issues) .453* .229
Groups in Second Level (Cases) 2.064* .137
Random Effects LR Test Chi Square 731.56*
Table A.5: Robustness check interacting average extremity with public opinion pressure. * indicates
p < .05
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Coefficient Standard Error
Ideological Preference for Grant -1.514* 0.224
Amicus Briefs 0.372* 0.137
Lower Court Dissent 0.874* 0.270
SG Opposes Grant -1.126* 0.277
Lower Court Judicial Review 3.841* 0.776
Landmark Legislation Involved -0.046 0.262
Public Issue Salience 9.526* 2.759
Public Opinion Pressure -0.471* 0.143
Lower Court Conflict 0.186 0.754
Diffuse Support -0.219* 0.065
Pressure x Diffuse Support 0.004* 0.001
Pressure x Lower Court Conflict 0.029* 0.014
Constant 23.878* 7.471
Observations 3303
Log Likelihood -1536.585
Random Effects Parameters Estimate Standard Error
Groups in First Level (Term Issues) .514* .237
Groups in Second Level (Cases) 2.067* .140
Random Effects LR Test Chi Square 743.40*
Table A.6: Robustness check including interaction with lower court conflict variable as proxy for
certworthiness and including direct effects of lower court judicial review and landmark legislation
as controls. * indicates p < .05
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Countervailing Public Opinion
Salience − Negative Interpretation 
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Figure A.3: Difference in marginal effects of public opinion on negative treatment of prece-
dent in the majority opinion given the minimum and maximum values of case salience.
Shaded region indicates the 95% confidence interval around the difference.
